Cooper v. City of New York: The Fellow Servant Rule - Wanted Dead or Alive by Thoresz, Monique N.
Pace Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 3 Spring 1995 Article 5
April 1995
Cooper v. City of New York: The Fellow Servant
Rule - Wanted Dead or Alive
Monique N. Thoresz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Monique N. Thoresz, Cooper v. City of New York: The Fellow Servant Rule - Wanted Dead or Alive, 15
Pace L. Rev. 911 (1995)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/5
Note
Cooper v. City of New York: The Fellow
Servant Rule-Wanted Dead or Alive
I. Introduction
The New York Court of Appeals in Cooper v. City of New
York' has implicitly revived a long-dead common law rule in
New York: the Fellow Servant Rule.2 In doing so, the court
highlights the intermingling of two closely related doctrines:
the Fellow Servant Rule and the Firefighter's Rule.3 The Fellow
Servant Rule, which has its roots in English common law,
evolved in this country in the mid-nineteenth century and pre-
vented employees who were injured in job-related accidents
caused by their co-workers' negligence from recovering finan-
cially from their employers. 4 Similarly, the common-law Fire-
fighter's Rule prevented firefighters and police officers from
recovering from their municipal employer for injuries sustained
in the line of duty.5 Although the two doctrines are similar in
that they both preclude recovery by workers injured during the
course of their employment, there are important differences in
their philosophical underpinnings, application, and viability
which are vital to their relevance in Cooper.6
1. 81 N.Y.2d 584, 619 N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1993).
2. See discussion infra part IIA.
3. The Firefighter's Rule has historically been referred to by some writers as
the Fireman's Rule. For the purposes of this Note, the gender-neutral designation
will be used.
4. See discussion infra part IIA.
5. See discussion infra part HI.B.
6. See discussion infra part IV.
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The Firefighter's Rule and the Fellow Servant Rule
presented an onerous burden for workers injured on the job.7
Recovery under the common law was extremely difficult and
often left injured workers uncompensated. Courts and com-
mentators have suggested that doctrines such as the Fellow
Servant Rule and Firefighter's Rule were used strategically by
nineteenth century courts to support and protect industry,
which was beginning to blossom at that time.,
During the mid-twentieth century, however, courts began
to express disfavor with both the Fellow Servant Rule and the
Firefighter's Rule. 9 After a series of decisions by the state's
lower courts,10 New York finally abrogated the Fellow Servant
Rule from its common law in 1982 with Buckley v. City of New
York." Similarly, New York retreated from its rigid stance
with regard to professional rescuers, minimizing the harsh ef-
fects of the Firefighter's Rule, by enacting various statutory
schemes to specifically allow recovery where in the past recov-
ery had been precluded.12
7. The common-law tort principle, assumption of risk, is often mentioned in
conjunction with, and used as support for, the Fellow Servant Rule and the
Firefighter's Rule. For a discussion of assumption of risk, see infra notes 25-26,
81-84 and accompanying text.
8. For example, Judge Gabrielli in Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d
300, 303, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (1982), stated that "the
[Fellow Servant] rule simply reflected a 19th century bias by the courts in favor of
business."
See also, Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant
Rule, 1837-1860, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 579, 580 (1984) [hereinafter Creation of a
Common Law Rule] (To economic and social determinists, "the Fellow Servant rule
is an example of the general development of tort law in the direction of protecting
nascent industry in an industrializing society.") (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERicAN LAW 262 (1973)).
9. See Poniatowski v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 76, 198 N.E.2d 237, 248
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1964); Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d
506 (2d Dep't 1981). See also Jakes v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 355, 357, 388
N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976) ("[This] court would much prefer
to declare the fellow-servant rule at long last dead and obsolete.").
10. See, e.g., Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506
(2d Dep't 1981); Jakes v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 355, 357,388 N.Y.S.2d 507,
509 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976).
11. 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982).
12. E.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW §§ 205-a, 205-e (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
See infra parts II.B.2 and II.B.5.
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In Cooper v. City of New York, 13 however, the Court of Ap-
peals took a dramatic turn in this area of the law. The plaintiff
in Cooper was a police officer who was injured when the police
car in which she was riding as a passenger-recorder 14 collided
with a car driven by a third party.' 5 The injured Officer Cooper
sued the city, the officer who was driving at the time of the acci-
dent, and the driver of the other car.16 The majority of the
Court of Appeals denied recovery for the plaintiff relying exten-
sively in its analysis on the Firefighter's Rule and its rationale.
The majority paid little attention to the Fellow Servant Rule,
dismissing it with minimal discussion. 17 The sole dissenter,
Judge Titone, sharply criticized the majority's holding and its
reasoning.'8 An analysis of both doctrines and their application
to the facts in Cooper posits that the holding by the New York
Court of Appeals launched into dangerous, unprecedented terri-
tory in New York's common law. This Note suggests that the
holding in Cooper not only resurrects a long buried doctrine-
the Fellow Servant Rule-but, for various policy reasons, works
an extreme hardship on professional rescuers.
Part II of this Note reviews the establishment and develop-
ment of both doctrines, discusses some of the policy reasons ad-
vanced both for and against their application, and examines
several statutory schemes which have limited their effective-
ness or eliminated them entirely. Part III discusses the injury
that gave rise to the Cooper decision, the procedural history,
and the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV of this Note
analyzes the implications of the Cooper decision and suggests
that the court's holding was both inappropriate and alarming.
13. 81 N.Y.2d 584, 619 N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1993).
14. The police officer who acts as the passenger-recorder is required to ride in
the front seat of the patrol car and is responsible for, among other things, operat-
ing the radio, and recording in the activity log radio messages directed to the car,
including time, location of call and type of case. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T,
PATROL GUIDE § 103-2 (May 15, 1987).
15. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 587, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
16. Id. at 587-88, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
17. The court noted that the plaintiff argued "that all fellow-servant claims of
negligence against the City are actionable because [the court has] abrogated the
general common-law fellow-servant doctrine" and that "[n]othing in... Santangelo
... supports that argument." Id. at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435
(citations omitted).
18. Id. at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436 (Titone, J., dissenting).
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Finally, this Note concludes by calling for a statutory remedy or
another alternative to minimize the impact of the decision.
II. Background
A. The Fellow Servant Rule
1. The Creation and Growth of the Doctrine
The Fellow Servant Rule is a common law doctrine which
traditionally prohibited an employee from recovering from his
employer for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of a
fellow employee. 9 The rule was established in England in
Priestly v. Fowler,20 and was carried over to the United States
in Murray v. South Carolina.21 The rule "carved out an excep-
tion"22 to the deeply rooted theory of respondeat superior.23
Some commentators have attributed the development of the
doctrine to the desire of courts to protect employers during the
time of tremendous commercial growth during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 24 Frequently, the Fellow
Servant Rule is discussed in conjunction with the theories of
19. 4 C.B. LABATr, CoMmENTARmEs ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 1393, at 4007 (1913).
20. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
21. 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841). Justice O'Neall wrote a noteworthy dis-
sent in Murray. He stated that, while a servant takes "as a consequence of his
contract, the usual and ordinary risks of his employment," negligence by a fellow
servant "does not result from the ordinary risks of employment." Id. at 403. Jus-
tice O'Neall also cited authority for the position that the master should be liable
for the negligent acts of his employees since such acts "result from the doing of
their business, by one employed by them." Id. at 404.
This recognition by Justice ONeall of the inherent flaws in the Fellow Servant
Rule foreshadowed the policy arguments made 144 years later when New York
abolished the doctrine. His dissent evidenced that, despite its viability for a time,
the doctrine's reasoning was questioned from its genesis. See Buckley v. City of
New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088,452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982). For a discus-
sion of Buckley, see infra part II.A.2.
22. Creation of a Common Law Rule, supra note 8, at 579.
23. The term literally means "[1]et the master answer." BLAciKs LAw DICTION-
ARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990). This doctrine stands for the proposition that an employer
may be held liable for the wrongful or tortious acts of his employee committed
while the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. Id. For further
discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984).
24. For a good discussion of the political and historical atmosphere of this pe-
riod and its effect on the development of the Fellow Servant Rule, see Creation of a
Common Law Rule, supra note 8.
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assumption of risk25 and contributory negligence. In fact, the
doctrines have been referred to as "the unholy trinity"26 of com-
mon-law defenses because of their devastating use by employ-
ers to avoid liability and to thwart employees' claims for on-the-
job injuries.
The Fellow Servant Rule was first established in New York
in Coon v. Syracuse & Utica R.R.27 Originally, the rule received
much support in New York,28 as well as in other jurisdictions. 29
25. The Appellate Division, Second Department, summarized the assumption
of risk theory as applied to the Fellow Servant Rule this way: "[Tihe rationale of
the term 'assumption of risk' as applied to the fellow-servant rule is that: 'One who
engages in work with others takes the chances, not only of his own negligence, but
of the negligence of which his fellow servants may be guilty. . . .'" Lawrence v.
City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 485, 497, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513 (2d Dep't 1981) (quot-
ing Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N.Y. 188, 198, 18 N.E. 870, 873 (1888)). The court
also noted that: "The rule does not rest on the ground that the negligence of the co-
employee is imputed to the servant, but on the ground that it is not imputed to the
master." Id. (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 80, at 569; Edward J. Higgins,
Comment, So Much "Quo" for So Little "Quid": Time for Michigan to Re-examine
the Intentional Tort Exception to Workers' Compensation Exclusivity, 1992 Dgr.
C.L. REV. 27, 33 ("Even in the rare case that an employee could establish fault on
the part of the employer, the employee would be extremely hard-pressed to over-
come the 'unholy trinity' of common law defenses .... ."); Jane P. North, Comment,
Employees'Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice?, 52 TNN. L. REv. 35, 36
(1984) ("the [assumption of risk] doctrine was seen as a bar not just to the worker's
recovery, but also to the ends of justice").
27. 5 N.Y. 492 (1851). The Supreme Court of New York first cited the Priestly
holding in Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844), but the New York
Court of Appeals did not decide the viability of the Fellow Servant Rule in that
jurisdiction until Coon. Citing Priestly and Murray, the court held: "The decision
of this [case] depends on a very important principle [the Fellow Servant Rule], one
which has been unfolded and brought to view within the last twenty years .... "
Coon, 5 N.Y. at 495. "It must now be considered as settled, and hereafter to form a
part of the common law of the country." Id. at 496.
28. See, e.g., Judson v. Village of Olean, 116 N.Y. 655, 22 N.E. 555 (1889);
Byrnes v. New York, Lake Erie & W. R.R., 113 N.Y. 251, 21 N.E. 50 (1889); Hussey
v. Coger, 112 N.Y. 614, 20 N.E. 556 (1889); Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N.Y. 188, 18
N.E. 870 (1888); Hudson v. Ocean S.S. Co., 110 N.Y. 625, 17 N.E. 342 (1888); Web-
ber v. Piper, 109 N.Y. 496, 17 N.E. 216 (1888); Anthony v. Leeret, 105 N.Y. 591, 12
N.E. 561 (1887); Neubauer v. New York, Lake Erie & W. R.R., 101 N.Y. 607, 4 N.E.
125 (1885); Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N.Y. 516 (1880); Henry v. Staten Island Ry., 81
N.Y. 373 (1880).
29. Massachusetts followed South Carolina's decision in Murray with Farwell
v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842), establishing the Fellow Ser-
vant Rule in that jurisdiction. The rule was followed, in various forms, in early
state cases: Cook & Scott v. Parham, 24 Ala. 21 (1853); Hobson v. New Mexico &
Ariz. Ry., 11 P. 545 (Ariz. 1886); Bloyd v. St. Louis & San Fran. Ry., 22 S.W. 1089
(Ark. 1893); Yeomans v. Contra Costa Steam Navigation Co., 44 Cal. 71 (1872);
5
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Although the Fellow Servant Rule was applied to police officers
and firefighters, the doctrine developed and applied with great
force to other professions, particularly railroad workers and
seamen.30 The Fellow Servant Rule quickly gained momentum,
and "[by 1880 the rule, in one form or another, was so firmly
entrenched in nearly every American jurisdiction that late nine-
teenth-century treatise writers warned legislatures and courts
against tampering with 'a rule of the common law, based upon
the wisdom and precedent of the ages.'"31
By the 1960s, the legal tide had changed and the courts and
commentators began to express disapproval with the doctrine.
3 2
Deep Mining & Drainage Co. v. Fitzgerald, 43 P. 210 (Colo. 1895); Wilson v. Willi-
mantic Linen Co., 50 Conn. 433 (1883); Parrish v. Pensacola & Atl. R.R., 9 So. 696
(Fla. 1891); Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195 (1846); Snyder v. Viola Mining &
Smelting Co., 26 P. 127 (Idaho 1891); Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & Chi. Ry. v. Powers, 74
Ill. 341 (1874); Madison & Indianapolis R.R. v. Bacon, 6 Ind. 205 (1855); Sullivan v.
Mississippi & Mo. R.R., 11 Iowa 421 (1861); Dow v. Kansas Pac. Ry. 8 Kan. 642
(1871); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Robinson, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 507 (1868); Towns
v. Vicksburg, S. & Pac. R.R., 37 La. Ann. 630 (1885); Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 48
Me. 291 (1860); Hanrathy v. Northern Cent. R.R., 46 Md. 280 (1876); Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Leahey, 10 Mich. 193 (1862); Brown v. Winona & St. P. R.R., 6 N.W.
484 (Minn. 1880); Howd v. Mississippi Cent. R.R., 50 Miss. 178 (1874); McDermott
v. Pacific R.R., 30 Mo. 115 (1860); Kelley v. Cable Co., 14 P. 633 (Mont. 1887);
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Howard, 63 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1895); Jacques v. Great Falls
Mfg. Co., 22 A. 552 (N.H. 1891); Collyer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 A. 437 (N.J. 1886);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Martin, 34 P. 536 (N.M. 1893); Dobbin v.
Richmond & Danville R.R., 81 N.C. 446 (1879); Elliott v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
41 N.W. 758 (Dakota 1889); Miller v. Southern Pac. R.R., 26 P. 70 (Or. 1891); Le-
high Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432 (1878); Gaffney v. New York & New
England R.R., 7 A. 284 (R.I. 1887); Fox v. Sandford, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 36 (1856);
St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. Ry. v. Welch, 10 S.W. 529 (Tex. 1888); Allen v. Logan City,
37 P. 496 (Utah 1894); Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Donnelly, 14 S.E. 692 (Va. 1892);
Davis v. Central Vt. R.R., 55 Vt. 84 (1882); Sayward v. Carlson, 23 P. 830 (Wash.
1890); Beuhring v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 16 S.E. 435 (W. Va. 1892); Dwyer v.
American Express Co., 52 N.W. 304 (Wis. 1892).
For a thorough discussion of the early development of the Fellow Servant Rule
in each jurisdiction, see 2 WILLIAM F. BAILEY, THE LAW OF PERSONAL INJURIES RE-
LATING TO MASTER AND SERVANT §§ 1796-2493 (1897).
30. See, e.g., Russell v. Hudson River R.R., 17 N.Y. 134, (1858) (applying the
Fellow Servant Rule to railroad workers); Hudson v. Ocean S.S. Co., 110 N.Y. 625,
17 N.E. 342 (1888) (longshoremen); Hussey v. Coger, 112 N.Y. 614, 20 N.E. 556
(1889) (carpenters); Stringharn v. Hilton, 111 N.Y. 188, 18 N.E. 870 (1888) (grain
elevator operators).
31. Creation of a Common Law Rule, supra note 8, at 579 (quoting 1 EDWARD
J. WHITE, THE LAW OF PERSONAL INJURIES ON RAILROADS § 315, at 417 (1909)).
32. For example, the New York Court of Appeals, in Poniatowski v. City of
New York, 14 N.Y.2d 76, 198 N.E.2d 237, 248 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1964), noted Dean
Prosser's criticism of the doctrine. The court stated: "Dean Prosser has character-
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Poniatowski v. City of New York33 "signaled the beginning of the
end"34 of the Fellow Servant Rule in New York. In Poniatowski,
a police officer was riding as a passenger-recorder 35 in a police
car driven by a fellow officer when the car collided with another
automobile in pursuit of a third vehicle.36 The plaintiff sued the
city under sections 50-a3 7 and 50-b38 of the General Municipal
Law,39 which was enacted to make municipalities liable for the
ized the fellow-servant rule as 'icked'... and one court has described it as result-
ing in 'gross injustice' and as 'callous to human rights.'" Id. at 81, 198 N.E.2d at
238, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (citations omitted).
Another author has referred to the Fellow Servant Rule as a "nefarious judi-
cial device for minimizing the burdens of industry .... " I. Leo Glasser, Torts and
Workmen's Compensation, 16 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 373, 382 (1964). See also supra
note 8.
33. 14 N.Y.2d 76, 198 N.E.2d 237, 248 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1964).
34. Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 1089,
452 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (1982).
35. For a definition of passenger-recorder, see supra note 14.
36. Poniatowski, 14 N.Y.2d at 79, 198 N.E.2d at 237, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
37. General Municipal Law § 50-a, provides, in relevant part:
Every city, town and village shall be liable for the negligence of a person
duly appointed by the governing board or body of the municipality . .. to
operate a municipally owned vehicle within the state in the discharge of a
statutory duty imposed upon the municipality, provided the appointee at
the time of the accident or injury was acting in the discharge of his duties
and within the scope of his employment.
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-a (McKinney 1986).
38. General Municipal Law § 50-b, provides, in relevant part:
Every county, city, town, village and other subdivision of government...
shall be liable and shall assume the liability for the negligence of, and shall
save harmless, a person duly appointed by the governing board or body of
the municipality ... in the operation of a municipally owned vehicle pro-
vided the appointee at the time of the accident or injury was acting in the
discharge of his duties and within the scope of his employment. Every such
appointee shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed an employee of
the municipality, notwithstanding the vehicle or other facility of transporta-
tion was being operated in the discharge of a public duty for the benefit of all
citizens of the community and the municipality derived no special benefit in
its corporate capacity.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-b (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
39. Both sections were enacted in 1936 and were derived from section 282-g of
the Highway Law. Act of Apr. 9, 1936, ch. 323, [1936] N.Y. Laws 674 (codified as
amended at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 50-a, 50-b (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
The Highway Law was enacted in 1929 and imposed liability on municipalities for
injuries to third parties caused by the negligence of police officers and firefighters.
Act of Apr. 10, 1929, ch. 466, [1929] N.Y. Laws 993. The difference between sec-
tions 50-a and 50-b is that "Section 50-a... continued municipal liability for torts
committed by municipal employees, in the operation of municipally-owned cars,
7
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negligent acts of city employees while operating municipally-
owned vehicles. 40
The Supreme Court, Kings County, entered judgment
against the city after a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.41
The city appealed, claiming that the common-law Fellow Ser-
vant Rule precluded recovery.42 The Appellate Division, Second
Department reversed the judgment of the trial court and dis-
missed the officer's complaint, holding that "since the plaintiff
was injured by a fellow servant, the common-law fellow-servant
doctrine constitutes a complete defense."43
while in the performance of a governmental function. Section 50-b provided for the
assumption of liability by the City for such negligence by the employee while oper-
ating a municipally-owned vehicle." Schwartz v. City of New York, 16 Misc. 2d
822, 824, 25 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1941).
40. Fiebinger v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 1007, 1009, 51 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944). At the time of Poniatowski, General Municipal Law
sections 50-a and 50-b applied to the City of New York, but a 1979 amendment
expressly exempted New York City from these provisions. Act of July 13, 1979, ch.
673, §§ 2, 3, [19791 N.Y. Laws 1302-03 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAw §§ 50-a, 50-b (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
Not raised by the plaintiff in Poniatowski was the statutory remedy provided
for in General Municipal Law § 50-c, which states, in relevant part:
Every city... shall be liable for, and shall assume the liability to the extent
that it shall save harmless any duly appointed policeman of the municipal-
ity ... or fire district for, the negligence of such appointee in the operation
of a vehicle upon the public streets ..... A policeman of a municipality or a
paid fireman of a municipality or fire district... shall be deemed to be act-
ing in the discharge of duty when engaged in the immediate and actual per-
formance of a public duty imposed by law and such public duty performed
was for the benefit of all the citizens of the community and the municipality
or fire district derived no special benefit in its corporate capacity.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-c (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995). This section also in-
cluded New York City in its coverage until the 1979 sovereign immunity amend-
ment. Act of July 13, 1979, ch. 673, § 4, [1979] N.Y. Laws 1303 (codified as
amended at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-c (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
These three provisions read together reveal "a series of statutes intended to
cover all possible situations." Schwartz v. City of New York, 16 Misc. 2d 822, 824,
25 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1941).
41. Poniatowski v. City of New York, 19 A.D.2d 64, 65, 241 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771
(2d Dep't 1963).
42. Id. The city had pleaded the Fellow Servant Rule as an affirmative de-
fense in its answer, id. at 66, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 772, but it is not clear whether the
trial court simply did not reach the issue at all or ruled adversely to the city.
43. Id. Justice Hopkins dissented and voted to grant a new trial. Notably, he
stated: "We should not be astute to expand the fellow-servant rule to police officers,
since ... in the statute imposing liability upon the city ... there is no exception
whereby the city is exempted from responsibility for the negligent acts of a fellow
918
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed, relying on a strict
interpretation of the General Municipal Law. The court noted
that, at common law, police officers and firefighters had not
been considered municipal employees but were rather, consid-
ered to be "agents performing a public duty and a governmental
function."44 Since at common law, municipalities could not be
held liable for the negligent acts of its employees, the city could
not be held liable in this case on a theory of respondeat superior
for damages caused by these professional rescuers.45 The court
reviewed the history of sections 50-a and 50-b of the General
Municipal Law, and concluded that it was the intent of the leg-
islature that a remedy be afforded to individuals injured by the
negligent operation of municipal vehicles. 46 The court held that
there was no reason that the statutory remedy available to the
general public by virtue of those General Municipal Law sec-
tions should not be available to police officers injured by fellow
servants as well.47
Although Poniatowski was decided on a strict interpreta-
tion of the statutory language of General Municipal Law sec-
tions 50-a and 50-b, the court made clear its disapproval of the
servant." Id. at 68-69, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75 (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (citing
Robinson v. City of Albany, 14 A.D.2d 626, 218 N.Y.S.2d 421 (3d Dep't 1961)).
44. Poniatowski, 14 N.Y.2d at 79, 198 N.E.2d at 237, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
45. Id. The court relied on In re Evans, 262 N.Y. 61, 67-68, 186 N.E. 203, 204-
05 (1933), and Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 366, 62 N.E.2d 604,
605 (1945). See also Pascarella v. City of New York, 146 A.D.2d 61, 538 N.Y.S.2d
815 (1st Dep't 1989), wherein the court remarked:
The law is well-settled that "[p]ublic entities remain immune from negli-
gence claims arising out of the performance of their governmental functions,
including police protection, unless the injured person establishes a special
relationship with the entity, which would create a specific duty to protect
that individual, and the individual relied on the performance of that duty."
Id. at 67, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 819 (quoting Miller v. State of New York, 62 N.Y.2d 506,
510, 467 N.E.2d 493, 495, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (1984)). For a complete discus-
sion of Pascarella, see infra notes 150-66 and accompanying text.
46. Poniatowski, 14 N.Y.2d at 80, 198 N.E.2d at 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
47. Id. The court noted that in the past, police officers had been permitted to
recover based on the negligence of fellow officers. In particular, it cited Wiseman
v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 952, 180 N.E.2d 57, 224 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1961),
wherein a police officer was injured in circumstances similar to Officer Poniatow-
ski. While the Court of Appeals recognized that the defendant city in Wiseman
had not asserted the Fellow Servant Rule as a defense, it stated: "[the city] did
oppose recovery on the closely related ground of assumption of risk.., and this
court had no hesitancy in affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff."
Poniatowski, 14 N.Y.2d at 81, 198 N.E.2d at 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
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Fellow Servant Rule in general, stating: "The inherent injustice
of a rule which denies a person, free of fault, the right to recover
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another over
whose conduct he has no control merely because of the fortui-
tous circumstance that the other is a fellow officer is
manifest."48
In Lawrence v. City of New York, 49 the Appellate Division,
Second Department, also strongly criticized the Fellow Servant
Rule. In Lawrence, the plaintiff, a New York City fireman, was
fighting a fire when he was struck by a couch which a fellow
firefighter had either thrown or pushed from a window of a
burning building.50 In its defense, the city asserted the com-
mon-law Fellow Servant Rule. 51 The trial court submitted the
case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff.52 Following the jury's verdict, the city's motion to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff was barred by
the Fellow Servant Rule was denied.53
The Second Department affirmed in an opinion which
traced the history of the Fellow Servant Rule from its origin.54
The court noted that the rule had been rendered useless by a
host of judicially created exceptions which "engraft[ed] upon it
so many modifications that little [was] left of its original
import."55
After evaluating the theories expounded for and against
the rule, the court concluded that it should be abolished, stat-
ing: "it is both illogical and self-defeating to continue a practice
of engrafting exception after exception upon a flawed rule of
48. Id.
49. 82 A.D.2d 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506 (2d Dep't 1981).
50. Id. at 485-86, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
51. Id. at 486, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
52. Id. The jury was given several interrogatories, and specifically found that
the negligence of the city was the proximate cause of the accident, that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent, and that he had not assumed the risk of the inci-
dent which caused his injuries. Id.
53. Id. at 489, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
54. Id. at 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
55. Id. at 502,447 N.Y.S.2d at 516. The court continued: "Amongst the multi-
tudinous number of exceptions to the rule are the nondelegable duty to furnish a
safe place to work, the duty to instruct and to warn, the 'vice-principal rule,' the
'superior servant rule,' the 'different department rule,' the 'dangerous agency rule,'
ad infinitum." Id.
920 [Vol. 15:911
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law, which was founded not on natural justice but on an absurd
and disingenuous public policy, and which has been universally
discredited almost from its inception."56 The Lawrence court de-
clared the Fellow Servant Rule "hereby abrogated."57
While the appellate division opinion in Lawrence would
seem to have been overshadowed by the subsequent Court of
Appeals decision,- s it is important because it represents a turn-
ing point in New York's common law. Prior to the Lawrence de-
cision, courts had almost universally applied the Fellow
Servant Rule without question,59 but the Lawrence court
sharply criticized the doctrine and questioned its soundness.60
This set the stage for the Court of Appeals to abrogate the Fel-
low Servant Rule completely.
2. The Death of the Fellow Servant Rule in New York
The New York Court of Appeals finally laid the Fellow Ser-
vant Rule to rest in Buckley v. City of New York,6 1 a consolida-
tion of two cases, Buckley v. City of New York, 62 and Lawrence v.
City of New York.63 These cases were brought up to the Court of
Appeals for the sole purpose of determining the viability of the
56. Id. at 502-03, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
57. Id. at 504, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Judge Titone, the author of the Lawrence
decision, has continued to hold this position as a member of the New York Court of
Appeals. As a Court of Appeals Judge, Judge Titone dissented in Kenavan v. City
of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 558, 570, 517 N.E.2d 872, 877, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65 (1987)
(Titone, J., dissenting) and in Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 592, 619
N.E.2d 369, 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 436 (1993) (Titone, J., dissenting). See infra
note 133 and part HI.D.
58. Lawrence was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals in Buckley v.
City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982). See
infra part II.A.2 for a discussion of Buckley.
59. But see Poniatowski, 14 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 198 N.E.2d 237, 238-39, 248
N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (1964) (refusing to extend the rule into an area to which it had
not previously been applied).
60. The court stated: "With respect to the rule itself, the theory upon which it
is based.., not only is untenable but is fallacious." Lawrence, 82 A.D.2d at 503,
447 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
61. 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982).
62. Buckley v. City of New York, 81 A.D.2d 1044, 439 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1st Dep't
1981).
63. 82 A.D.2d 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506 (2d Dep't 1981). See supra notes 49-60
and accompanying text.
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Fellow Servant Rule in New York.6 The two cases presented
similar scenarios.
In Buckley, a police officer was shot in the leg by a fellow
officer who was attempting to reload his gun in the locker room
of the police station house.65 The Court of Appeals discussed
several theories supporting the Fellow Servant Rule; the most
convincing was that the rule "promotes the safety of the public
and of the workers by encouraging each employee to be watch-
ful of the conduct of others for his own protection."6 6 The court
also acknowledged the role that the doctrine of assumption of
risk had played in the historical development of the Fellow Ser-
vant Rule67 and noted that public sentiment at the time of the
rule's inception "simply reflected a 19th century bias by the
courts in favor of business."68 The court criticized that ration-
ale, however, noting that "the class of persons most frequently
endangered by the negligence of an employee" 69 are his fellow
workers. Therefore, the court suggested that employers should
be held liable for the negligent acts of their employees, since
they are in the best position to select competent personnel. 70
The court acknowledged the damaging blow the Poniatowski de-
cision had dealt to the Fellow Servant Rule, stating: "In
Poniatowski v. City of New York ... our court signaled the be-
ginning of the end of the fellow-servant rule in New York."71
Finally, the court noted that the thrust of the Fellow Ser-
vant Rule had been "drastically curtailed" 72 by the arrival and
development of the workers' compensation legislation.73 In con-
64. Id.
65. Buckley, 56 N.Y.2d at 302, 437 N.E.2d at 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
66. Id. at 303,437 N.E.2d at 1089,452 N.Y.S.2d at 332. Presumably the argu-
ment is that if an employee knows she cannot recover from her employer for the
negligent acts of her fellow employee, it will cause her to be more cautious in her
work.
67. Id. The court stated: "It has also been suggested that the rule was based
upon the notion that an employee assumes the risk of negligence on the part of his
fellow servants Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 304, 437 N.E.2d at 1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
72. Id. at 303, 437 N.E.2d at 1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
73. Id. The New York Workers' Compensation Law specifically provides that
"it shall not be necessary [for an employee] to plead or prove freedom from contrib-
utory negligence nor may the defendant plead as a defense that the injury was
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clusion, the court stated that the Fellow Servant Rule "merely
work[ed] an unjustifiable hardship upon individuals injured in
the workplace"74 and held that it was no longer to be followed in
New York. 75
B. The Firefighter's Rule
1. Justification and Early Application
The common law doctrine known as the Firefighter's Rule
was introduced in the United States in the late nineteenth cen-
tury by Gibson v. Leonard,76 and was adopted in New York
shortly thereafter. 77 The rule essentially prohibits recovery by
firefighters who sustain injuries in the line of duty.78 Unlike
the Fellow Servant Rule, however, the Firefighter's Rule is ap-
plied when the firefighter's injuries are the result of a third
party's negligence, not the negligence of a fellow firefighter or
officer. As the law developed, the Firefighter's Rule was ex-
tended to apply to police officers as well. 79 The courts have re-
caused by the negligence of a fellow servant nor that the employee assumed the risk
of his employment .... " N.Y. WoRK. COMP. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1986) (emphasis
added). However, the remedies of the Workers' Compensation Law are available
to police officers and firefighters only on an extremely limited basis. See N.Y.
WoRK. CoMP. LAw § 30 (McKinney 1986). See also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 207-c
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
74. Buckley, 56 N.Y.2d at 305, 437 N.E.2d at 1090, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
75. Id.
76. 32 N.E. 182 (IlM. 1892).
77. The earliest New York court citing Gibson as authority for the
Firefighter's Rule was the Court of Appeals in Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229
N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920) (holding that a fireman entering premises to extin-
guish a fire is not merely a licensee, and thus property owners owe a duty to exer-
cise care to keep the premises in reasonably safe condition). However, more recent
New York cases typically only cite McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 20 N.Y.2d
921, 233 N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967), as authority for the Firefighter's
Rule. For a discussion of McGee, see infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
78. David L. Strauss, Comment, Where There's Smoke, There's the
Firefighter's Rule: Containing the Conflagration after One Hundred Years, 1992
Wis. L. REv. 2031, 2031 n.2. As Strauss points out, the Gibson court, while holding
that a firefighter who was injured in the line of duty could not recover against the
landowner for negligence in maintaining an elevator shaft, analyzed the liability
issue "on the basis of traditional status categories of entrants upon property of
another and classified the firefighter as a licensee." Id.
79. Santangelo v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 393, 521 N.E.2d 770, 526
N.Y.S.2d 812 (1988), is given credit as being the first decision to apply the com-
mon-law Firefighter's Rule to police officers as well. But see Racine v. Morris, 136
A.D. 467, 121 N.Y.S. 146 (1st Dep't 1910) (holding that a police officer is a licensee
1995] 923
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ferred to this extension as the Santangelo Rule after the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in Santangelo v. State of New
York .80
The traditional Firefighter's Rule is based on several theo-
ries. The first is the principle of assumption of risk,81 which has
long been a defense to negligence actions.8 2 Various courts have
commented on this theory as a basis for supporting the
Firefighter's Rule. For instance, the Appellate Division, First
Department, has stated:
Firemen and fire patrolmen are bound to anticipate that many
fires do start from carelessness on the part of someone .... Once
a fire starts and the firemen or fire patrolmen arrive on the scene,
they assume the usual risks inherent in their work, including
those arising from contact with flames or smoke, or from the col-
lapse in the ordinary course of the fire of ceilings, walls and floors
of buildings.83
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in Santangelo ob-
served that "persons who choose to become firefighters assume
the risks of fire-related injuries, including the risk of negligence
by operation of law through public necessity and therefore cannot recover for in-
jury due to negligence of landowner).
80. 71 N.Y.2d 393, 521 N.E.2d 770, 526 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1988). See, e.g., Dami-
ani v. City of Buffalo, 198 A.D.2d 814, 814, 603 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1007 (4th Dep't
1994); Starkey v. Trancamp Contracting Corp., 152 A.D.2d 358, 360, 548 N.Y.S.2d
722, 723 (2d Dep't 1989); Pascarella v. City of New York, 146 A.D.2d 61, 68, 538
N.Y.S.2d 815, 810 (1st Dep't 1989) (all citing Santangelo as applying the
Firefighter's Rule to police officers). For a complete discussion of Santangelo, see
infra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
81. This principle of tort law, derived from the maxim volenti non fit injuria,
essentially means that "a person may not recover for an injury received when he
voluntarily exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger." BLAces LAw
DICTIONARY 123, 1575 (6th ed. 1990). For a good discussion of assumption of risk
as a tort principle, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 68, at 480.
82. "At common law, firefighters were held to have assumed the risks of their
profession and were denied recovery for injuries sustained while combatting fires
even though the owner of the premises on which the fire occurred was negligent in
creating the condition that caused the accident." Kenavan v. City of New York, 70
N.Y.2d 558, 566, 517 N.E.2d 872, 874, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (1987). Some courts
have attempted to further distinguish between so-called "primary" and "secon-
dary" assumption of the risk; "secondary" assumption of the risk being something
akin to contributory negligence. See Winn v. Frasher, 777 P.2d 722 (Idaho 1989)
(citing Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369 (Idaho 1985) and Fawcett v. Irby, 436 P.2d
714 (Idaho 1968)).
83. McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 190, 271 N.Y.S.2d
698, 706 (1st Dep't 1966). See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
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of property owners and occupants in maintaining their
premises."84
The second reason most frequently asserted in support of
the common-law Firefighter's Rule also comes from the basic
law of torts, and addresses the status of firefighters as entrants
upon property.8 5 Traditionally, firefighters and police officers
have been held to be licensees8 when they entered property in
the course of their official duties.8 7 The general duty owed to
licensees is merely the duty to refrain from intentional harm or
willful or wanton misconduct;m in general, there is no obligation
to inspect or prepare the premises for them in any way.8 9 More
recently, firefighters have been classified not in terms of tradi-
tional entrant status categories-that is, licensees, invitees or
trespassers-but as a special class unto themselves, sui
generis,90 "privileged to enter the land for a public purpose, irre-
spective of consent."91
84. 71 N.Y.2d at 397, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
85. Indeed, this is how the Illinois Supreme Court in Gibson v. Leonard fo-
cused its analysis. The Gibson court, while recognizing that firefighters, in the
course of extinguishing fires, may lawfully enter the property of another, neverthe-
less held that the plaintiff-firefighter "when he entered the building, was, by the
rules of the common law, a mere naked licensee .... ." Gibson, 32 N.E. at 184.
86. The Court of Appeals in Santangelo stated that the initial rationale for the
Firefighter's Rule was that firemen were typically treated as licensees.
Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 396-97, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813. This
argument, while not fully explained in the Santangelo opinion, reasons that when
firefighters entered a premises to extinguish a fire, they were merely licensees, and
therefore "took the property as they found it." Id. See Racine v. Morris, 136 A.D.
467, 121 N.Y.S. 146 (1st Dep't 1910) (holding that police officers are licensees by
operation of law through public necessity); Eckes v. Stetler, 98 A.D. 76, 90 N.Y.S.
473 (1st Dep't 1904) (holding that a fireman is a licensee). But see Meiers v. Fred
Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 15, 127 N.E. 491, 492 (1920) (stating that it would be a
"misuse of terms" to call a fireman a licensee).
87. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 61, at 429. Professors Prosser and Keeton
also note that although a small number of states have treated firefighters and po-
lice officers as invitees, "there does not appear to be any trend in this direction nor
sufficient reason on balance for moving the law this far." Id. at 432.
88. Id. at 430.
89. Id.
90. The term literally means "[o]f its own kind or class." BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). See also Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of
Owner or Occupant of Premises to Fireman Coming Thereon in Discharge of His
Duty, 11 A.L.R. 4th 597, 602-07 (1982) (discussing classification of firefighters sui
generis).
91. McGee, 26 A.D.2d at 191, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 707. See infra notes 96-108 and
accompanying text.
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A third argument which has been raised in support of the
Firefighter's Rule is grounded in what has been called public
policy.92 The rationale is that firefighters and police officers are
not only specially trained to confront the dangers of their work,
but are also amply compensated for the hazards they encounter,
both through their wages and through retirement benefits. 93
Thus, it is argued, to allow them to recover for line-of-duty inju-
ries would be anomalous.94 One court summarized this concept
as follows:
[Miunicipalities employ firefighters precisely because special
skills and expertise are required to confront certain hazards-
usually of an emergency nature-that expose the public to dan-
ger, these hazards often arise from negligence, and as a matter of
public policy firefighters trained and compensated to confront
such dangers must be precluded from recovering damages for the
very situations that create a need for their services. 95
An example of a strict application of the traditional com-
mon-law Firefighter's Rule in New York is McGee v. Adams Pa-
per & Twine Co.96 In McGee, New York City firefighters were
92. See, e.g., Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d 393, 397, 521 N.E.2d 770, 771, 526
N.Y.S.2d 812, 813. ("The 'fireman's rule' has also been grounded on public policy
93. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 205 (McKinney 1986) (authorizing pay-
ments to injured or representatives of deceased volunteer firefighters); N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW §§ 207, 207-a, 207-c (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing hospi-
talization benefits for injured firefighters, as well as payment of salary, medical
and other expenses); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 208-b (McKinney 1986) (authorizing
death benefits for firefighters and police officers). See also N.Y. RETRE. & Soc.
SEC. LAW §§ 360-363-c (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) (describing death benefits
and disability retirement for police officers and firefighters).
94. See, e.g., Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 398, 521 N.E.2d at 772, 526 N.Y.S.2d at
814. The court stated:
[O]ur decision is ... predicated upon . .. sound considerations of public
policy resting on the nature of the occupation-which often requires police
to confront negligently created emergencies .... Here the anomaly of per-
mitting recovery by police officer would be particularly evident: allowing re-
covery against the State for injuries incurred while apprehending an
escaped mental patient would result in the payment of damages by the pub-
lic for injuries sustained by the experts it employs to deal with such
situations.
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of Santangelo, see infra notes 134-49 and
accompanying text.
95. Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 397, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813
(emphasis added).
96. 20 N.Y.2d 921, 233 N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967).
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called to the scene of a fire in a six-story building.97 While at-
tempting to extinguish the fire, the building collapsed, killing
two firemen and four fire patrolmen. 98 The plaintiffs, who rep-
resented the respective estates of the firefighters,99 sued New
York City, the Fire Commissioner, the Commissioner of Build-
ings, as well as the landlord and owner of the building.1°° At
the close of trial, the Supreme Court, New York County, dis-
missed the claims against the first three defendants, leaving
only the owner and landlord in the action.10 1 Claims by the
plaintiffs against the owner and landlord were grounded in neg-
ligence, and included allegations of careless smoking by employ-
ees, overloading of a storeroom in the building, and installation
and maintenance of an unsafe recreation room, among others. 102
The appellate division reversed and vacated a judgment by
the trial court which had been entered upon a jury verdict for
the plaintiffs; dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as to the
owner and landlord; and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court dismissing the complaint against the municipality, the
fire commissioner, and the commissioner of buildings. 10 3 The
appellate division used the assumption of risk argument to sup-
port its application of the Firefighter's Rule and to undermine
the plaintiffs' claims against the city and the fire commissioner,
stating that the fire patrolmen had "voluntarily entered the
premises during the fire on their own responsibility in perform-
ance of their duties independent of the fire-fighting operations in
charge of the Fire Department employees of the city."1°4 Because
their entry into the building "was not performed at or under the
specific direction of the Fire Chief"105 the firefighters "had no
97. McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 189, 271 N.Y.S.2d
698, 704 (1st Dep't 1966).
98. Id. at 188, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
99. McGee, 20 N.Y.2d at 921, 233 N.E.2d at 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
100. Id.
101. McGee, 26 A.D.2d at 188, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
102. Id. at 189-90, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 705-06. While one plaintiff alleged a cause
of action against the remaining defendants based upon General Municipal Law
§ 205-a, the Court of Appeals never even reached the issue. Id. at 194, 271
N.Y.S.2d at 709-10. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text for a discussion
of General Municipal Law § 205-a.
103. McGee, 26 A.D.2d at 198-99, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14.
104. Id. at 196, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 711 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
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right to assume that the Fire Department employees were
under any obligation with respect to their safety other than to
refrain from reckless acts or affirmative acts of carelessness
. .. .- The Court of Appeals affirmed, without opinion.0 7
Although McGee was decided in 1967, after the enactment of
General Municipal Law section 205-a,108 it represents the tradi-
tional common-law Firefighter's Rule and provides a glimpse of
the inequity the rule worked on professional rescuers.
2. Statutory Relief for Firefighters and Limitations of
That Remedy
In 1935, in response to the absence of a remedy for firefight-
ers injured in the line of duty, the New York Legislature en-
acted General Municipal Law section 205-a'0 9 to provide
firefighters with a remedy where none had existed previously. 0
The statute allows firefighters to recover from third parties for
their failure to comply with statutory requirements which re-
sult in a fire and a subsequent injury to a firefighter."' One
court stated that section 205-a was enacted "[in an attempt to
ameliorate the harsh result of the common-law rule,""12 and
that the statute had "the intention of creating a cause of action
where otherwise there would be no right of recovery for the in-
106. Id. at 196, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
107. McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 20 N.Y.2d 921, 233 N.E.2d 289,286
N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967).
108. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
109. General Municipal Law § 205-a provides, in relevant part:
[In the event any accident, causing injury, death or a disease which results
in death, occurs directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission,
wilful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply
with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances ... and require-
ments of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments... the
person or persons guilty of said neglect, omission, wilful or culpable negli-
gence at the time of such injury or death shall be liable to pay any officer,
member, agent, or employee of any fire department injured, or whose life
may be lost while in the discharge or performance of any duty.., a sum of
money ....
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 205-a (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
110. The predecessor of General Municipal Law § 205-a was section 761 of the
Greater New York Charter. 1901 N.Y. Laws 316 and 1882 N.Y. Laws 116 (re-
pealed 1935), cited in Kenavan v. City of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 558, 566, 517
N.E.2d 872, 874-75, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62-63 (1987).
111. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 205-a.
112. Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 566, 517 N.E.2d at 874, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
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jury or death of a firefighter."" 3 This was an important devel-
opment because one of the basic tenets underlying the
Firefighter's Rule was that "firefighters injured while extin-
guishing fires generally cannot recover against the property
owners or occupants whose negligence in maintaining the prem-
ises occasioned the fires."114
The statutory remedy was not designed to cover all situa-
tions, however, and thus did not bury the Firefighter's Rule.
For example, the New York Court of Appeals, in Kenavan v.
City of New York, expressly limited the scope of section 205-a to
property owners.115 In Kenavan, four firemen and the estate of
a fifth brought an action against New York City to recover for
damages they sustained while extinguishing a fire that ignited
an abandoned car on the street.116 The driver of the fire truck
was attempting to direct traffic around the scene, but a second
car, not visible to the firefighters because of heavy smoke condi-
tions, struck all five plaintiffs, killing one. 17
The plaintiffs sued the city, the fire department captain,
and the driver of the fire truck, asserting claims sounding in
common law negligence and under section 205-a of the General
Municipal Law."" In addition, the plaintiffs alleged a cause of
action against the driver .of the vehicle which struck them. 19
The plaintiffs' common-law claim of negligence was based on
the theory that the city had breached its duty to keep public
streets in a safe condition when it failed to remove the aban-
doned car from the street.120 The plaintiffs also argued that the
city's failure to remove the car from the street constituted a vio-
lation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law' 21 and several other New
113. Id.
114. Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 396, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813
(citing Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d 558, 517 N.E.2d 872, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60; McGee, 26
A.D.2d 186, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698).
115. 70 N.Y.2d 558, 517 N.E.2d 872, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1987).
116. Id. at 564-65, 517 N.E.2d at 873-74, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 61-62.
117. Id. at 564, 517 N.E.2d at 873, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
118. Kenavan v. City of New York, 120 A.D.2d 193, 195, 507 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26
(2d Dep't 1986).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 195, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
121. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1224 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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York City regulatory provisions, 12 2 thus constituting the requi-
site statutory violation for purposes of invoking section 205-a of
the General Municipal Law.123
After both sides had rested, the trial court denied the city's
motion to dismiss the complaint and submitted the case to the
jury.124 The jury found the city liable, and the court entered
judgment on the verdict.125 The Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, reversed, holding that the complaint should have
been dismissed before submission to the jury. m With regard to
the cause of action under General Municipal Law section 205-a,
the court acknowledged that:
The Legislature, in creating such additional cause of action, in the
interests of protecting firemen against the hazards of such [statu-
tory] violations, may be considered as having intended to impose
liability in any case where there is any practical or reasonable con-
nection between a violation and the injury or death of a fireman.127
In this case, however, the appellate division noted that the
statutory provisions alleged to have been violated "were clearly
enacted and promulgated in order to enable the city to take title
to abandoned cars for the limited purpose of removing these
cars from the streets where they are eyesores, and, after giving
proper notice, to sell [them] . . . ."12 As such, "[tihose legal re-
quirements are not fire preventive in nature and the violations
thereof were not practically or reasonably connected to the inju-
ries suffered by the plaintiffs." 129 Thus, the appellate division
concluded that the cause of action under section 205-a should
not have been sent to the jury.13°
122. Plaintiffs alleged violations of§ 31 of the Administrative Code of the City
of New York and General Order 5 of the Department of Sanitation. Kenavan, 70
N.Y.2d at 565, 517 N.E.2d at 874, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 62. These provisions, as well as
§ 1224 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, all "impose a duty on the City to promptly
remove abandoned vehicles from the roadways. . . ." Id.
123. Kenavan, 120 A.D.2d at 28, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
124. Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 565, 517 N.E.2d at 874, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
125. Id.
126. Kenavan, 120 A.D.2d at 29, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
127. Id. at 31, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (quoting McGee, 26 A.D.2d at 195, 271
N.Y.S.2d at 698) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 33, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the
statutory antecedent1 31 of the statute in question "compels the
conclusion that the scope of section 205-a is limited to property
owners and the maintenance of premises in a safe condition for
firefighters."132 The court also noted that the statutory viola-
tions referred to in section 205-a could include, but were not
limited to, violations of fire preventive regulations. 133 This limi-
tation of the scope of section 205-a was an example of further
refinement of the statutory remedy granted to firefighters.
3. Application of the Firefighter's Rule to Police Officers
Notwithstanding the hardship that the Firefighter's Rule
worked on professional rescuers, the doctrine was extended to
police officers in Santangelo v. State of New York.134  In
Santangelo, the plaintiffs were two police officers who sustained
injuries while attempting to bring into custody a patient who
had escaped from a state mental facility. 35 Although the pa-
tient "had a history of confinement and escape"136 from the facil-
ity, the hospital did not notify the police of his escape but simply
marked the patient's file "discharged."137 After a telephone call
from the patient's uncle, the plaintiff police officers were dis-
patched to apprehend the patient. 38 During a scuffle with the
patient, both officers were injured.139 They brought suit against
131. See supra note 110.
132. Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 566, 517 N.E.2d at 875, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
133. Id. at 567, 517 N.E.2d at 875, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 63. Judge Titone dis-
sented and voted to reverse in a separate opinion. He stated:
That the municipality does owe a duty of care to the firefighters it employs is
apparent from such cases as Buckley v. City of New York . . . in which the
City was held liable for injuries suffered by a firefighter as a result of a co-
worker's negligence. Indeed, the holding in Buckley-that the former fel-
low-servant rule is no longer viable-would make little sense if the court's
intention was to preclude recovery where a firefighter's injury resulted from
the carelessness of a colleague.
Id. at 571, 517 N.E.2d at 878, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 66 (Titone, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Judge Titone's policy views on this issue have remained consistent
throughout his tenure in the New York Court system. See supra note 57 and infra
part III.D.
134. 71 N.Y.2d 393, 521 N.E.2d 770, 526 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1988).
135. Id. at 395-97, 521 N.E.2d at 770-71, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13.
136. Id. at 395, 521 N.E.2d at 770, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 395-96, 521 N.E.2d at 770, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
139. Id. at 396, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
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the state alleging one cause of action under common-law negli-
gence and another alleging that the state had violated certain
Department of Mental Hygiene regulations.140
The New York Court of Claims found that the state was
negligent by allowing the patient to escape and by marking his
file "discharged" after he had escaped.14' Nonetheless, the court
refused to grant recovery for the plaintiffs because (1) "public
policy precluded it";142 (2) the plaintiffs were "not within the
class intended to be protected by the regulations";' 43 and (3)
even if the plaintiffs were within the class, appropriate notifica-
tion had been made.'" The Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, affirmed. 145
The New York Court of Appeals likewise affirmed, examin-
ing the various theories used to support the Firefighter's Rule.
The court focused on the public policy argument, which it felt
"most aptly support[ed] the rule,"146 noting that firefighters re-
ceive special training for their duties and are compensated for
the on-the-job risks they take.147 The court found that these
140. Id. The regulations dealt with escapees, first in marking the patient
"discharged," and second, in failing to give the police department the appropriate
"particular notice" of his escape and history of dangerousness. Id.
141. Id. at 396, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813. The court stated:
Based on the manner in which [the patient] was confined, given his many
successful escapes, three of which were accomplished in the same manner,
the record clearly indicates a casual, almost cavalier attitude, on the part of
the State toward the safety of the public as it related to the custody and
supervision of this dangerous individual. The administration of this hospi-
tal in dealing with [the patient] during his confinement was almost reckless
in failing to more closely supervise him.
Santangelo v. State of New York, 129 Misc. 2d 898, 901-02, 494 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51
(Ct. Cl. 1985).
142. Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 396, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
The Court of Claims stated:
The denial of recovery for injuries to policemen caused by another's negli-
gence which creates the very occasion for their engagement cannot be said
to violate our concepts of justice. The many benefits available to policemen
to compensate them for the hazards they face, fully justify, for sound public
policy reasons, denial of double recovery from the public trough.
Santangelo, 129 Misc. 2d at 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 54-55.
143. Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 396, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
144. Id.
145. 127 A.D.2d 647, 511 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1987).
146. 71 N.Y.2d at 397, 521 N.E.2d at 771, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
147. Id.
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policy considerations applied equally to police officers, 148 and ex-
tended the doctrine to include those professionals as well. The
court concluded that a negligence action was not maintainable
by police officers against their municipal employers. 149
The Appellate Division, First Department, in Pascarella v.
City of New York' 50 added what appeared to be a further gloss to
the Santangelo Rule. 51 The court emphasized the assumption
of risk rationale as a basis for narrowing the scope of the in-
quiry when a police officer is injured in the line of duty.152
In Pascarella, the plaintiff was a New York City police of-
ficer who had recently been assigned to the Headquarters Se-
curity Unit (HSU) at One Police Plaza.153 On New Year's Eve
1982, a terrorist group detonated a series of bombs in lower
Manhattan.' 54 Since one of the functions of the HSU is to
"maintain a high level of security at, and around the perimeter
of, One Police Plaza, for the protection of both the employees of
the Police Department and the public,"155 Officer Pascarella was
instructed to conduct a perimeter check of the police headquar-
ters. 5 6 In conducting the search he came across what appeared
to be a small bag containing trash.157 When he walked away
from the bag, a bomb exploded, causing extensive damage to the
area and severing the lower portion of the officer's right leg.158
Officer Pascarella sued the New York City Police Depart-
ment and the City of New York in common-law negligence,
148. Id. at 397-98, 521 N.E.2d at 771-72, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 813-14.
149. Id. Subsequent to the dismissal of Officer Santangelo's common-law neg-
ligence claim, he filed a second action in the Court of Claims in 1990 alleging a
violation of N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 205-e which was given retroactive effect by the
legislature in 1990. See infra part II.B.5 for a full discussion of § 205-e. The sec-
ond suit is still being litigated in the courts. Santangelo v. State of New York, 193
A.D.2d 25, 601 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2d Dep't 1993) (reversing and remitting opinion of
the Court of Claims which declared the retroactivity of the amendment to N.Y.
GEN. MuN. LAw § 205-e unconstitutional).
150. 146 A.D.2d 61, 538 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1st Dep't 1989).
151. In his dissent in Cooper, Judge Titone commented on the relevance of
Pascarella to the application of the Firefighter's Rule. See infra notes 265-67 and
accompanying text.
152. Pascarella, 148 A.D.2d at 69, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
153. Id. at 63, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 64, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 65, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
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claiming that he had been given virtually no training in bomb
detection. 5 9 At trial, the court read to the jury excerpts from A
Functional Guide for Fire Security Officers and Deputy Fire Se-
curity Officers, which was developed to "establish a uniform set
of procedures for officers to follow in the event of a fire, explo-
sion or bomb threat at Police Headquarters." 160 The jury was
instructed that if it found that the procedures detailed in the
handbook had been violated, and such violation was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident, it could consider those violations a
breach of a duty of care. 161 The jury returned with a verdict in
favor of the officer, and the court entered judgment thereon.162
The First Department reversed the lower court and dis-
missed the complaint. 163 The court relied heavily on the Court
of Appeals' recent decision in Santangelo, noting that police of-
ficers "'receive both training that enables them to minimize the
dangers their occupation requires them to face, and compensa-
tion and special benefits to help assure that the public will bear
the costs of injuries suffered by its protectors in the line of
duty.'"164 The court continued: "Clearly, individuals who elect
to join the uniformed services do so with knowledge of the dan-
gers attendant upon those occupations and the distinct possibil-
ity that they might be hurt in the course of their
employment."165 Finally, the appellate division rejected Officer
Pascarella's argument that the "Functional Guide" handbook
created a special relationship between himself and the police
department such that failure to adhere to the guidelines consti-
tuted per se negligence by the defendants.166
Thus, the Pascarella court reaffirmed the principle of
Santangelo by using an "assumption of the risk argument": that
officers enter the uniformed forces aware of the possible dan-
159. Pascarella v. City of New York, 135 Misc. 2d 719, 720, 516 N.Y.S.2d 579,
581 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
160. Pascarella, 146 A.D.2d at 65, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
161. Id.
162. Pascarella, 135 Misc. 2d at 727, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
163. Pascarella, 146 A.D.2d at 73, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
164. Id. at 69, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 820 (quoting Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 397-98,
521 N.E.2d at 772, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 814).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 70, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
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gers, and that this awareness precludes them from recovering
from the public coffers for injuries sustained in the line of duty.
4. Erosion of the Doctrine
Furch v. General Electric C0.167 marked the beginning of
what appeared to be an exception to the Santangelo Rule: the
"separate and apart" theory.168 In Furch, six firefighters were
attempting to extinguish a fire in a state office building when
the building's electrical system malfunctioned.1 69 When the fire
broke out, large amounts of toxic substances were released and
carried through the building by the ventilation system.1
70
While extinguishing the fire and cleaning up the toxic sub-
stances, the plaintiff-firefighters inhaled the toxic fumes, sus-
taining injuries.' 71 The firefighters sued the architect, engineer,
and various contractors involved in the planning and construc-
tion of the building in common-law negligence, based on the de-
fendants' negligent installation and maintenance of the
building's electrical system. 72 The trial court denied the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed. 173
The Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the
plaintiffs' claim was "sufficiently separate and apart" 74 from
the negligence that had occasioned the emergency for which the
plaintiffs were summoned, and thus, the Firefighter's Rule did
not bar recovery. While the court eventually dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint on another issue-that the defendants
were not in control "at the time of the injury"175 as required by
section 205-a' 76-the recognition by the court of a possible ero-
sion of the Firefighter's Rule stood out as a signal of a possible
turn of events.
167. 142 A.D.2d 8, 535 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3d Dep't 1988).
168. Id. at 12, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
169. Id. at 10, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 10-11, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 182-83.
173. Id. at 8, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
174. Id. at 12, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
175. Id. at 13, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
176. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 205-a.
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Similarly, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in
Starkey v. Trancamp Contracting Corp.,177 recognized the "sepa-
rate and apart" exception 78 to the common-law barrier to recov-
ery imposed by the Firefighter's Rule that had been alluded to
in Furch, though it did not cite its sister court. The plaintiff in
Starkey was a police officer who responded to a citizen's com-
plaint about children playing around a demolition site.179 In the
course of investigating the complaint, Officer Starkey tripped
over debris and was injured. 80 The officer brought an action in
common-law negligence' 8 ' against the City of New Rochelle and
Trancamp Contracting Corporation for the negligent mainte-
nance of a demolition site. 8 2
The Westchester County Supreme Court granted the city's
motion for summary judgment, but denied the contractor's simi-
lar motion.183 While recognizing the broad common-law bar to
actions under the Santangelo Rule, the appellate division found
that the acts surrounding the injury and the act which caused
the need for the officer's services were "sufficiently separate and
apart from the negligent acts which allegedly caused his inju-
ries,"18 4 to render Santangelo inapplicable. The court further
noted that in considering actions by police officers injured in the
line of duty, "the determinative factor [is] the degree of separa-
tion between the negligent act directly causing the injury and
the act which occasioned the police officer's services." 185
The Fourth Department also recognized the "separate and
apart" exception to the Firefighter's Rule in Guadagno v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R.' 86 There, the plaintiff-police officer was su-
177. 152 A.D.2d 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1989).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 359, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
180. Id. at 360, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
181. The plaintiff in Starkey presumably could not bring an action under Gen-
eral Municipal Law § 205-e because the statute did not take effect until July 12,
1989. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 205-e (McKinney Supp. 1995). See infra part II.B.5
for a discussion of General Municipal Law § 205-e.
182. Starkey, 152 A.D.2d at 359, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
183. Id. at 360, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 723. The supreme court also dismissed the
contractor's cross-claim against the city based on the city's affirmative defense
under the Workers' Compensation Law. Id.
184. Id. at 363, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
185. Id. at 361, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
186. 155 A.D.2d 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1989).
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pervising the excavation of a derailed train when the train car
toppled over and released methyl chloride gas, which caused the
officer's injuries. 8 7
The officer sued the railroad company, claiming that it had
failed to properly warn the officers during the excavation at-
tempt that the train contained toxic chemicals.'88 The defend-
ants moved for summary judgment under Santangelo, but the
supreme court denied the motion. 8 9 The appellate division af-
firmed, stating:
While Santangelo ... bars a claim for negligence in causing the
derailment, it does not preclude a claim for negligently failing to
warn plaintiff of the hazard .... With respect to the hazard
caused by dropping the car, the Fireman's Rule is inapplicable be-
cause that alleged negligence was not the reason plaintiff was on
the scene.190
The First Department finally joined its sister courts in
adopting the "separate and apart" exception' 91 to Santangelo in
Sharkey v. Mitchell's Newspaper Delivery, Inc.192 The plaintiff's
decedent, a New York City police officer, was directing traffic at
the scene of an accident when he was struck and killed by a
truck owned by the defendant newspaper company. 193 The ad-
ministratrix of Officer Sharkey's estate sued the newspaper
company and the driver of the truck. 194
187. Id. at 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
188. Id. at 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 967. Officer Guadagno also sued L.C.P.
Chemicals & Plastics and its subsidiary corporation, L.C.P. Chemicals. The de-
fendants then impled the Town of Hamburg, New York, as a third party defendant.
Guadagno v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 142 Misc. 2d 712, 712, 538 N.Y.S.2d 386, 386
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1988).
189. Guadagno, 142 Misc. 2d at 714, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
190. 155 A.D.2d at 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (emphasis added). After Officer
Guadagno refused to stipulate that his injuries resulted from exposure only after
the train had tipped over, the trial court precluded all parties from submitting
proof that the officer's injuries resulted from exposure to methyl chloride during
the evacuation. Id. The Appellate Division reversed that order, finding that the
defendants' potential liability for failing to warn the officer "extends to the evacua-
tion phase as well as the later phase when the tank car fell." Id. at 981-82, 548
N.Y.S.2d at 967.
191. See infra part III.C.1 for the New York Court of Appeals' discussion of
the viability of the "separate and apart" exception.
192. 165 A.D.2d 664, 560 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1990).
193. Id. at 664, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
194. Id.
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The defendants moved for summary judgment under
Santangelo,195 claiming that the Firefighter's Rule bars "recov-
ery by uniformed officers injured while performing a function
within the scope of their duties."196 The trial court denied the
motion, and the appellate division affirmed, stating that "since
[the defendant] was not involved in the accident which created
the need for the presence of decedent in the first instance and
since [the] defendant's negligence was separate and apart from
the act which occasioned the services of decedent as a police of-
ficer, this action [was] not governed by [Santangelo] ....- 197
By 1990, all four departments of the appellate division rec-
ognized the apparent "separate and apart" exception to
Santangelo.198 In Cooper, however, the New York Court of Ap-
peals explicitly rejected the exception. 199
5. Statutory Restrictions on the Firefighter's Rule as
Applied to Police Officers
In 1989, the New York Legislature finally extended to po-
lice officers the statutory remedy already available to firefight-
ers by enacting General Municipal Law section 205-e. 2°°
Subsection 1 of the statute provides, in relevant part:
[I]n the event any accident, causing injury, death or a disease
which results in death, occurs directly or indirectly as a result of
any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person
or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the
statutes, ordinances . . . and requirements of the federal, state,
county, village, town or city governments..., the person or per-
sons guilty of said neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence
at the time of such injury or death shall be liable to pay any of-
ficer, member, agent or employee of any police department in-
195. See supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
196. Sharkey, 165 A.D.2d at 664, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
197. Id. at 664, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
198. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Mitchell's Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 165 A.D.2d 664,
560 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1990); Starkey v. Trancamp Contracting Corp., 152
A.D.2d 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1989); Furch v. General Electric Co., 142
A.D.2d 8, 535 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3d Dep't 1988); Guadagno v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
155 A.D.2d 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1989).
199. See infra part III.C.1.
200. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 205-e (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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jured, or whose life may be lost while in the discharge or
performance ... of any duty ... a sum of money ... .201
The legislative history of this statute indicated a desire for
equality among professional municipal employees.
A substantial question of fairness is raised by the long term exist-
ence of a remedy for firefighters that negates the fireman's rule
that is not enjoyed by police officers as well. The existing law pro-
vides firefighters with a right of action where death or injury is
attributable to an "accident" encountered in the line of duty. Po-
lice officers are no better trained than are firefighters in avoiding
accidents. 202
Section 205-e has been amended three times since its en-
actment. Since the original version of the statute had only pro-
spective effect,20 3 the first amendment, in 1990, made the
provision retroactive, reviving all causes of action which were
viable in 1987, provided that an action was commenced before
June 30, 1991.204
The second amendment, enacted in 1992, broadened the
scope of the statute by inserting the language "at any time or
place" into the body of subsection one.20 5 This amendment re-
sulted from the New York Legislature's displeasure with the
201. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-e (McKinney Supp. 1995). While the texts of
sections 205-a and 205-e are virtually identical, the Committee on Pattern Jury
Instructions Association of Supreme Court Justices points out an important differ-
ence in the two statutory sections: "unlike General Municipal Law § 205-a, § 205-e
does not 'expand or restrict any right afforded to or any limitation imposed' by
virtue of the Workers' Compensation Law." 1 LEON D. LAZER ET" AL., NEW YORK
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 96 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
202. Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in [1989] N.Y.
Laws 2141.
203. The original version of § 205-e simply stated: "This act shall take effect
immediately." See Act of July 22, 1990, ch. 762, [1990] N.Y. Laws 1552.
204. The relevant portion of the statute after the 1990 amendment stated:
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law... every cause of action for
the personal injury or wrongful death of a police officer which was pending
on or after January 1, 1987, or which was dismissed on or after January 1,
1987 .... or which would have been actionable on or after January 1, 1987
had this section been effective is hereby revived ....
Act of July 22, 1990, ch. 762, [1990] N.Y. Laws 1551-52 (emphasis added). This
amendment became effective on July 22, 1990. Id.
205. Act of July 17, 1992, ch. 474, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1325. This amendment
became effective on July 17, 1992. Id.
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way courts were interpreting section 205-e.206 The Senate com-
mented on the purpose of the amendment:
A problem has arisen with respect to the statute. Some appellate
courts and lower courts of this State have held.., that [section
205-e] allows a police officer to recover only when he or she is in-
jured or killed by reason of the violation of some statute, regula-
tion, rule or code pertaining to the safe maintenance and control
of premises .... By limiting the application of Section 205-e to
premises-related claims, many injured police officers have been
deprived of any meaningful right of recovery under this statute.207
The Senate committee continued, noting that "[u]nlike firefight-
ers, however, police officers sustain performance-related inju-
ries in a variety of non-property related contexts."20 8 The
official comment of the legislature in enacting the 1992 amend-
ment states:
The legislature concludes that the duties of our state's police of-
ficers are performed in a variety of contexts and that the liability
imposed pursuant to [this section] should not be limited to viola-
tions pertaining to the safe maintenance and control of premises.
Since our police officers are required to confront dangerous condi-
tions under many and varied circumstances, there is a need to
206. See generally Memorandum from Senator Dean G. Skelos and Assembly-
man Eric Vitaliano in support of N.Y.S. 8474, 215th Sess. (1992) (on file with Pace
Law Review).
207. Memorandum from Senator Dean G. Skelos and Assemblyman Eric
Vitaliano in support of N.Y.S. 8474, 215th Sess. (1992) (on fie with Pace Law
Review).
208. Id. In a Memorandum in Support of the proposed amendment, Brian
Shoot, a member of the Committee on State Legislation of the New York State
Trial Lawyer's Association, stated: "The problem is that while the statutory provi-
sions [of § 205-el explicitly apply to violation[s] of 'any' regulation, ordinance, etc.
which causes injury, the courts have nonetheless generally limited recovery to vio-
lation[s] of mandatory provisions pertaining to maintenance of real property."
Memorandum of Brian Shoot in support of N.Y.S. 8474, N.Y.A. 11632, 215th Sess.
(1992) (on file with Pace Law Review).
Mr. Shoot cited the appellate division opinion of Cooper v. City of New York,
182 A.D.2d 350, 582 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1st Dep't 1992), as well as Sciarrotta v.
Valenzuela, 182 A.D.2d 443, 581 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1st Dep't 1992); Sutherland v. Hal-
len Constr. Co., 183 A.D.2d 887, 585 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 1992); and Austin v.
City of Buffalo, 179 A.D.2d 1075, 580 N.Y.S.2d 604 (4th Dep't 1992) as examples of
court decisions which had so limited § 205-e. Memorandum of Brian Shoot in sup-
port of N.Y.S. 8474, N.Y.A. 11632, 215th Sess. (1992) (on fie with Pace Law
Review).
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ensure that a right of action exists regardless of where the viola-
tion causing injury or death occurs.20 9
Finally, in August 1994, the Legislature further expanded the
retroactive effect of section 205-e, extending the time period in
which officers had to bring an action to 1995.210
III. Cooper v. City of New York
A. Facts
Gertrude Jones Cooper was a New York City police officer
assigned to ride as a passenger-recorder 11 in a police car driven
by another officer, Steven Bakal.21 At approximately 9:00 p.m.
on December 14, 1984, the officers received a top-priority "1013"
call over the police radio, which required an immediate re-
sponse from the officers 213 because it indicated that another of-
ficer was in need of assistance. 214 Bakal and Cooper proceeded
at approximately forty miles per hour with the car's emergency
lights flashing and siren sounding.215 Officer Cooper was in-
jured when the police car, through the negligent driving of Of-
ficer Bakal, crashed into the rear end of defendant Millicent
Hall's car, which was stopped at a red light.216 In the accident,
Officer Cooper "slammed into the dashboard,"217 suffering inju-
209. Act of July 17, 1992, cl. 474, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1325 (emphasis added).
210. Act of Aug., 2, 1994, ch. 664, [19941 N.Y. Laws 1636.
211. Officer Cooper testified that a "recorder" officer "sits on the passenger
side of the police car[,] answers the radio, [and] under normal circumstances fills
out reports." Record on Appeal at 460, Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584,
619 N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1993) (No. 15024/85) [hereinafter Record]. See
also supra note 14 for a discussion of the recording officer's functions.
212. Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 587,619 N.E.2d 369, 370, 601
N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (1993).
213. Id.
214. Record at 465.
215. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 587, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
216. Id. The opinion states that there was a conflict in the proof as to whether
Hall had changed lanes immediately prior to the accident. Id. Hall testified at
trial that she had been traveling in the right-hand lane of traffic for at least one
block before the scene of the accident, and that she had not switched lanes at any
point prior thereto. Record at 103. However, Officer Bakal testified that when he
first observed Hall's vehicle, it was in the left-hand lane, id. at 214, but that Hall
had moved over to the right-hand lane shortly before the accident. Id. at 216. Hall
also testified at trial that she had been stopped at the red light with her foot on the
brake for approximately sixty seconds before the accident occurred. Id. at 105.
217. Id. at 458.
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ries primarily to her knees, which left her in considerable pain
and unable to walk without use of a cane and a knee brace.218
B. Procedural History
Officer Cooper sued New York City, Officer Bakal, and Hall,
the driver of the other car, in common-law negligence. 219 Prior
to trial, the action against Officer Bakal was dropped by stipula-
tion.220 At the close of the evidence, the city moved to dismiss
Cooper's complaint, citing Santangelo where the Firefighter's
Rule was extended to police officers. 221 The Supreme Court de-
nied the motion and submitted the case to a jury, which con-
cluded that Officer Bakal's negligence was the sole cause of the
accident and awarded Officer Cooper $4,820,500.222
The city made a post-trial motion to dismiss under
Santangelo, as well as a motion to set aside the verdict.223 The
court denied both motions, but granted the city's alternative
motion to reduce the verdict and, accordingly, entered judgment
for a reduced sum.224 The city appealed the verdict and Cooper
cross-appealed on the issue of damages. 225 The Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, unanimously reversed the judgment of
the supreme court and dismissed Officer Cooper's complaint
against the city.226 The Court of Appeals granted Officer Cooper
leave to appeal to address her contention that the "separate and
218. Id. at 468, 476, 484. Officer Cooper testified that her injuries progres-
sively worsened after the accident, causing her knees to buckle under her. Id. at
479. Eventually, arthroscopic surgery to her right knee was required. Id. at 479.
Officer Cooper was reassigned to desk duties following the accident. Id. at
473. She was transferred several times and eventually discharged from the New
York City Police Department in 1987. Id. at 482. When the accident occurred in
1984, Officer Cooper was 23 years old. Id. at 462.
219. Id. at 16a-20a.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 587, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433. See
supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Santangelo.
222. Cooper v. City of New York, 182 A.D.2d 350, 350, 582 N.Y.S.2d 394, 394
(1st Dep't 1992).
223. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 588, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
224. Id. The supreme court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial un-
less Officer Cooper stipulated to a reduction in the verdict. Record at 42a. She so
stipulated, and judgment was entered for $819,766. Cooper, 182 A.D.2d at 350,
582 N.Y.S.2d at 394. See also Record at 42a.
225. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 588, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
226. Id. Although not pleaded in the complaint or raised at trial, the appel-
late division considered and rejected plaintiff's unpreserved, alternate claim of lia-
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apart" exception 227 recognized by various departments of the ap-
pellate division rendered Santangelo inapplicable. 228
C. The Majority Opinion
1. "Separate and Apart"
Before addressing Officer Cooper's assertion that the Court
of Appeals should adopt the "separate and apart" theory recog-
nized by the appellate divisions, 229 the court reviewed its prior
holding in Santangelo.2 0 It noted that the court in Santangelo,
which applied the Firefighter's Rule to police officers, based its
decision on the theory that police officers, like firefighters, as-
sume the risk of injuries in carrying out the duties of their pro-
fession. 231 The court stated that the "policy considerations"
underlying the Firefighter's Rule "are equally relevant to line-
of-duty injuries sustained by police officers." 232 The court then
concluded that Officer Cooper, like Officer Santangelo, "was
performing a function endowed with the special risks inherent
in the duties of a police officer."2-3
Cooper urged the court to adopt the test articulated in Star-
key v. Trancamp Construction Corp.,234 that "the application of
Santangelo should depend on 'the degree of separation between
the negligent act directly causing the injury and the act which
occasioned the police officer's services.'-235 In response, the
bility under General Municipal Law § 205-e. Id. The record is unclear as to why
Officer Cooper did not plead a cause of action under the statute.
227. See infra part III.C.1.
228. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 588, 619 N.E.2d at 370, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433. See
supra part II.B.4 for a discussion of this exception. Cooper relied on the following
cases in support of her "separate and apart" argument: Janeczko v. Duhl, 166
A.D.2d 257, 560 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1990); Sharkey v. Mitchell's Newspaper
Delivery, Inc., 165 A.D.2d 664,560 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1990); Starkey v. Tran-
camp Contracting Corp., 152 A.D.2d 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1989).
Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 589, 619 N.E.2d at 371, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
229. See supra part II.B.4.
230. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 588-89, 619 N.E.2d at 370-71, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433-
34.
231. Id. at 589, 619 N.E.2d at 371, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 433-34.
232. Id. at 589, 619 N.E.2d at 371, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
233. Id.
234. Starkey, 152 A.D.2d 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 722. See supra notes 177-85 and
accompanying text.
235. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 590, 619 N.E.2d at 371, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 434 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Starkey, 152 ALD.2d at 361, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 724).
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court stated that "[o]ur Court has never adopted the proposed
'separate and distinct' exception and, indeed, to do so would be
inconsistent with the rationale of Santangelo."236
Instead, the court pointed to the First Department's deci-
sion in Pascarella v. City of New York, 237 where the court stated
that the "determinative factor" was whether the injury to the
officer was related to "particular dangers which police officers
are expected to assume as part of their duties."2  The majority
also adopted the Pascarella court's statement that" 'individuals
who elect to join the uniformed services do so with knowledge of
the dangers attendant upon those occupations and the distinct
possibility that they might be hurt in the course of their
employment.' "239
The court in Cooper concluded that "there is no question
that plaintiff's injuries were related to a particular risk that she
had assumed as part of her duties. Part of that risk was the
possibility of injury while rushing to the scene of an emer-
gency."24° The majority emphatically rejected the "separate and
apart" test, concluding: "That no connection can be shown be-
tween Officer Bakal's negligence and the unknown incident that
gave rise to the emergency call is of no moment. What matters
is the connection between plaintiff's injury and the special haz-
ard that plaintiff assumed as part of her police duties."241
2. The Fellow Servant Rule
The court then turned to Officer Cooper's alternative con-
tention that the Santangelo rule should not apply because her
injuries were the result of the negligence of a fellow officer.242
236. Id.
237. 146 A.D.2d 61, 538 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1st Dep't 1989). See supra notes 150-
66 and accompanying text.
238. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 590, 619 N.E.2d at 371, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 434 (citing
Pascarella, 146 A.D.2d at 68-69, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 820).
239. Id. at 590, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (quoting Pascarella,
146 A.D.2d at 69, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 820).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 590-91, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
242. Id. at 591,619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435. Cooper relied heavily
on Poniatowski in her argument before the Court of Appeals. Her brief, states, in
part:
In Poniatowski,... the plaintiff passenger-police officer was a recorder in a
police vehicle operated by a fellow officer which collided with another vehicle
[Vol. 15:9 11944
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The majority framed the issue as follows: "In effect, [Cooper]
argues that all fellow-servant claims of negligence against the
City are actionable because we have abrogated the common-law
fellow-servant doctrine [in Buckley v. City of New York] .... 243
The court quickly dismissed that contention by stating: "Noth-
ing in our Santangelo decision supports that argument.... We
thus reject the broad 'fellow-servant exception' to Santangelo
urged by plaintiff and apparently the dissent."244
Moreover, the court rejected a distinction between injuries
a police officer sustains as the result of negligence of a fellow
officer versus those resulting from the negligence of a civilian.245
The court reasoned that the "policy reasons"246 supporting the
common-law Firefighter's Rule "apply equally whether these
hazards relate to negligence of third parties or fellow
servants."2
47
3. A 'Wide Range of Claims"20
The majority attempted to stress that police officers and
firefighters would not be left completely without a potential
remedy from the city for injuries sustained in the line of duty at
the hand of another officer, stating:
We emphasize, however, that the Santangelo Rule does not pre-
clude all causes of action against a municipality for injuries re-
sulting from a fellow police officer's negligence .... Obviously,
injuries could be sustained by police officers as a result of negli-
while in pursuit of a third vehicle. In reinstating a judgment against the
City, this Court ruled that the fellow servant doctrine was inapplicable, and
cited numerous cases where judgments in favor of policemen or firemen were
upheld who were injured in municipally owned vehicles as a result of the
negligence of fellow officers.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 25, Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 619
N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1993) (No. 15024/85).
243. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (cita-
tions omitted).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. The "policy reasons" cited by the court were "that police officers and
firefighters are trained and compensated to encounter the special hazards inherent
in their work and assumed as part of their employment. .. ." Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
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gence of their fellow officers during the performance of their work
which are wholly unrelated to the assumed risks of police duty."49
The court also stated: "[T]he Santangelo Rule bars only
those claims for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow
police officer when the injury is related to the dangers that are
associated with police functions ..... -2o The court cited injuries
"resulting from the bomb explosion"25 1 and from "the improper
apprehension of a suspect"252 as examples of injuries which
would be outside the scope of Santangelo. The court stated that
neither Santangelo nor the court's decision in the instant case
would bar the "wide range of claims" where the risk factors "on
which the Santangelo decision is predicated are not present."253
Finally, the court stated that its decision was not inconsis-
tent with its prior holding in Kenavan v. City of New York, 254
which limited the scope of General Municipal Law section 205-
a255 to "property owners and the maintenance of premises in a
safe condition for firefighters."256 The court distinguished the
two cases, stating that in Kenavan, the plaintiff's complaint
was dismissed "for a different and unrelated reason; i.e., on the
basis of the general governmental immunity rule protecting a
municipality from liability for 'judgmental errors in the exercise
of its governmental functions.'"257
D. The Dissent
Judge Titone, the sole dissenter in Cooper, questioned the
validity of applying the Firefighter's Rule in cases where a pro-
249. Id. at 591-92, 619 N.E.2d at 372-73, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36.
250. Id. at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
251. Id. at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (citing Pascarella, 146
A.D.2d 61, 538 N.Y.S.2d 815). See supra notes 150-66 and accompanying text.
252. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 591-92, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435
(citing Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d
331 (1982). See supra part II.A.2.
253. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
254. 70 N.Y.2d 558, 517 N.E.2d 872, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60. See supra notes 115-33
and accompanying text.
255. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 205-a (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995). See supra
notes 109-14 and accompanying text. This statute provided firefighters injured
during the performance of their duties with a right of action against third parties
whose negligence caused the fire. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 205-a.
256. Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 566, 517 N.E.2d at 875, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
257. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436 (quot-
ing Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 569, 517 N.E.2d at 876, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 64).
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fessional rescuer is injured by the negligence of a fellow munici-
pal employee. 258 Judge Titone argued that Officer Cooper's
claim "has been permitted and is directly governed by an in-
dependent line of cases,"259 and pointed out that the
Firefighter's Rule had never been applied in New York to pre-
vent recovery for line-of-duty injuries which are the result of the
negligence of a fellow servant. 260
Judge Titone argued that to disallow recovery for an in-
jured employee would create an anomaly, since, if the injured
person were a third party instead of a fellow employee of the
tortfeasor, recovery would be allowed.261 Judge Titone stated:
"[In Buckley,] we reasoned that it was illogical to permit a third
party, but not an employee, to recover from the employer for the
negligence of a co-worker where 'in both instances the employer
might have avoided the injury by selection of more careful em-
ployees.'"262 Judge Titone continued: "Indeed, the Buckley
Court acknowledged that 'the class of persons most frequently
endangered by the negligence of an employee-his fellow work-
ers-should not, without compelling reason, be denied a remedy
accorded to the general public.'-213 Judge Titone rebutted the
majority's declaration that its decision was consistent with
Kenavan by showing that the holdings in prior Court of Appeals
cases would have been unnecessary if the Firefighter's Rule pre-
cludes recovery in all instances:
258. 81 N.Y.2d at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436 (Titone, J.,
dissenting). Judge Titone also dissented in Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 570, 517 N.E.2d
at 877, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (Titone, J., dissenting), wherein he recognized the valid-
ity of the "broad legal proposition" of the Firefighter's Rule, but suggested that
courts should examine the negligent act of the fellow servant and determine
whether it was "a pure error in judgment and [thus] immune from liability or...
outside the realm of accepted practice and therefore actionable." Id. at 571, 517
N.E.2d at 878, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
259. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436
(Titone, J., dissenting). Judge Titone cited Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 558, 517 N.E.2d
at 872, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 60, and McCormack v. City of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 808,
600 N.E.2d 211, 587 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1992), as examples of this independent line of
cases. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 592-93, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436
(Titone, J., dissenting).
260. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
261. Id. at 594-95, 619 N.E.2d at 374-75, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
262. Id. (quoting Buckley, 56 N.Y.2d at 303, 437 N.E.2d at 1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d
at 332).
263. Id. at 595, 619 N.E.2d at 375, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 438 (quoting Buckley, 56
N.Y.2d at 303, 437 N.E.2d at 1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 332).
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Indeed, if the 'firefighter rule' bars recovery for all line-of-duty in-
juries regardless of the source of the negligence, as the majority
holds, application of the governmental immunity doctrine to bar a
suit where the colleague's official action involves the exercise of
expert judgment in policy matters would be unnecessary. 264
Judge Titone also questioned the majority's assertion that
Pascarella was decided by the application of the Firefighter's
Rule. Pascarella, he stated, concerned "two separate aspects of
the governmental immunity doctrine; the 'special duty' rule and
the 'immunity for discretionary decisions'265 rule."286 Moreover,
Judge Titone observed, the court in Pascarella specifically rec-
ognized "that a municipality could be responsible under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior 'for acts committed by its
employees in the scope of their employment.'"267
Judge Titone rebuffed the majority's suggestion that the
Firefighter's Rule "'does not preclude all causes of action
against a municipality for injuries resulting from a fellow police
officers' negligence,' but only those in which the injuries are 're-
lated to the dangers that are associated with police func-
tions.'"268 The majority, he stated, "fails to explain what
'obvious' category of cases would involve injuries during work
performance which are 'wholly unrelated to the assumed risks
of police duty.' "29 As Judge Titone pointed out, a municipality:
can only be held liable on respondeat superior theories for an em-
ployee's negligent conduct that occurs during the scope of employ-
ment, i.e., during crime-fighting or firefighting. Thus, despite the
majority's protestation, it is hard to imagine any instance where
264. Id. at 596, 619 N.E.2d at 376, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
265. This doctrine holds that "when official action involves the exercise of dis-
cretion, the [municipal] officer is not liable for the injurious consequences of that
action even if resulting from negligence or malice." Tango v. Tulevech, 61 N.Y.2d
34, 40, 459 N.E.2d 182, 185, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 76 (1983).
266. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 594, 619 N.E.2d at 374, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 437
(Titone, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 596, 619 N.E.2d at 375, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 438 (quoting Pascarella,
146 A.D.2d at 68, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 819).
268. Id. at 597, 619 N.E.2d at 376, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (quoting majority
opinion, id. at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435).
269. Id. (quoting majority opinion, id, at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 372-73, 601
N.Y.S.2d at 436).
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the majority's holding would not bar recovery for a fellow-ser-
vant's negligence. 270
Noting that the New York Court of Appeals-the state's
highest court-is at liberty to alter the common law at its
choosing,2 71 Judge Titone diverged from the majority on a public
policy standpoint. He advocated a remedy for police officers
who are injured in circumstances such as the one in Cooper,
stating:
As between a negligent member of the general public and a
trained police officer or firefighter, losses due to negligence at the
scene of the emergency should be assumed by the trained expert.
However, no similar policy consideration justifies application of
[the Firefighters] rule where the plaintiff and the tortfeasor are
presumably equally trained, and where the plaintiff, a passenger
in a negligently driven police car, had no more opportunity than a
member of the general public would have had to employ any spe-
cial skills to avoid injury.272
Judge Titone also differentiated between the risks associ-
ated with fighting fires or crime and the risks encountered
when fellow employees are negligent.273 He concluded that
risks associated with the carelessness of co-workers should not
be borne by the non-negligent employees, since they are not
risks these professionals "expect to encounter in the ordinary
course of their employment."274
In the last segment of Judge Titone's dissent, he noted that
the majority's holding is at odds with "a trend in other jurisdic-
tions towards limiting application of the rule by creating excep-
tions for independent acts of negligence or willful and wanton
conduct."275 Judge Titone concluded by stating that the major-
ity's holding amounted to a revival of the Fellow Servant Rule
270. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 597, 619 N.E.2d at 376, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (em-
phasis added).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 598, 619 N.E.2d at 376-77, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40 (emphasis
added).
273. Id. at 597, 619 N.E.2d at 376, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 598, 619 N.E.2d at 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 440. Judge Titone cited
Garcia v. City of South Tucson, 640 P.2d 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Rose v. City of
Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Ct. App. 1984); Winn v. Frasher, 777 P.2d 722
(Idaho 1989); Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1984); Griffith v. South-
land Corp., 617 A.2d 598 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Wagener v. Burmeister, 858
1995] 949
39
PACE LAW REVIEW
as it pertains to firefighters and police officers which was abro-
gated in Buckley.276
IV. Analysis
Cooper v. City of New York 277 held that police officers, as
professional rescuers, cannot recover from their municipal em-
ployers for injuries sustained in the line of duty. The majority
of the Court of Appeals reached its decision based on a liberal
interpretation of the rationale supporting the common-law
Firefighter's Rule. This reasoning, however, is flawed in three
respects.
First, the majority inappropriately looked exclusively to the
Firefighter's Rule for support in denying Officer Cooper recov-
ery. Since the facts of the case implicated both the Fellow Ser-
vant and the Firefighter's Rule, the court should have
formulated its analysis with both doctrines in mind. Second,
since the majority's decision has effectively resurrected the Fel-
low Servant Rule, it contradicts a trend in New York case law
and statutory law granting recovery to municipal employees in-
jured in the line of duty. Third, the majority's denial of recovery
to Officer Cooper is premised on policy grounds which are inor-
dinately harsh, and which contradict important public policies
that the court recognized in Buckley.
A. Revival of the Fellow Servant Rule
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals in Cooper
placed far too much emphasis on the Firefighter's Rule in decid-
ing the case. Standing alone, the Cooper decision amounts to a
revival of the Fellow Servant Rule because it does not properly
take into consideration the intersection of both the Fellow Ser-
vant Rule and the Firefighter's Rule under the facts of the case.
The facts presented in Cooper do not fit neatly within either the
Firefighter's Rule or the Fellow Servant Rule exclusively. The
range of possible actionable injuries suffered by a police officer
or firefighter in the line of duty may be summarized as follows:
S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Gould v. George Brox, Inc., 623 A.2d 1325 (N.H.
1993); Mahoney v. Carus Chem. Co., 510 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1986).
276. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 598, 619 N.E.2d at 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 440
(Titone, J., dissenting).
277. 81 N.Y.2d 584, 619 N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1993).
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Firefighter's.Rule Fellow Servant Rule
The left circle represents line-of-duty injuries suffered by
police officers and firefighters as a result of another person's
negligence. The right circle represents injuries suffered by em-
ployees at the hands of their co-workers. The shaded section
represents professional rescuers such as Officer Poniatowski,
Officer Buckley, and Officer Cooper: police officers and firefight-
ers who are injured in the line of duty by other police officers
and firefighters.
Because of the unique factual circumstances which give
rise to the shaded portion of the chart, Judge Titone's observa-
tion that the Firefighter's Rule "has not previously been applied
in New York to bar recovery for line-of-duty injuries occasioned
by the plaintiff's fellow servant"278 takes on tremendous signifi-
cance. Injuries caused by a fellow worker have always been an-
alyzed under the Fellow Servant Rule-an "independent line of
cases"279-which ceased to be a part of New York's common law
in 1982 with Buckley v. City of New York. 280 As Judge Titone
stated in his dissent in Cooper: "The existence of this peculiarly
applicable precedent renders the majority's extension of the
'firefighter rule' an unwarranted intrusion on settled principles
278. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 593, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436
(Titone, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 592-93, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
280. 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982). See supra
part II.A.2.
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without compelling justification."281  Judge Titone also
observed:
Significantly, both Buckley and its companion case .. . involved
line-of-duty injuries sustained by members of the City's uni-
formed services. Yet, the Court did not feel called upon to apply
the "firefighter rule" as a bar to recovery even though that rule
had been in existence for at least 14 years.282
This observation adds support to the conclusion that the
Firefighter's Rule was never intended to apply to injuries
caused by a fellow employee and the Court of Appeals seems to
have impliedly so held.
Although the Firefighter's Rule and the Fellow Servant
Rule are similar, in that they both work to preclude recovery at
common law for injuries sustained in the course of employment,
they are not identical. The Fellow Servant Rule contemplates a
finite set of tortfeasors: the injured party's fellow workers. The
Firefighter's Rule, however, anticipates a potentially infinite set
of tortfeasors: any person, from a fellow employee to a third
party who causes injury to a professional rescuer in the course
of the rescuer's employment. If the analysis ended there, the
rationale for the Firefighter's Rule would seem logical from a
policy standpoint: fighting crimes or fires is dangerous, and if
recovery were permitted every time a police officer or firefighter
were injured, the cost of providing such services to the public
would be astronomical. It can be argued that it is precisely be-
cause these occupations are so riddled with danger that legisla-
tive devices such as three-quarters disability and generous
retirement packages have been instituted.m Indeed, the Court
of Claims in Santangelo pointed out that allowing such actions
would permit "double recovery from the public trough."2s4
The Fellow Servant Rule, however, is based upon a differ-
ent rationale than its common-law counterpart. As commenta-
tors have noted, the Fellow Servant Rule was a judicially-
created device used to promote the growth of industry in the
281. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 594, 619 N.E.2d at 374, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 437
(Titone, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 595, 619 N.E.2d at 375, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 438 (Titone, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
283. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
284. Santangelo, 129 Misc. 2d at 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 54-55.
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nineteenth century by protecting employers from costly litiga-
tion . 5 From a socio-economic standpoint, the policies underly-
ing the development of the rule made sense, and, although the
effects of the rule were harsh, it played an important role in the
development of this country's industrial base during that
period.
Notwithstanding its original logic, however, the rationale
which was initially offered in support of the Fellow Servant
Rule is simply not as compelling today as it was in the nine-
teenth century. During that period, the railroad industry was
one of the largest in the United States. Railroads employed
many thousands of workers to lay tracks literally from one end
of the country to the other. With that infrastructure now in
place, and absent any large-scale industry comparable to rail-
roads since that time, the judicial shelter offered to employers
in the form of the Fellow Servant Rule at the expense of injured
workers is not as compelling or as necessary. In fact, it was
precisely because of the rule's harsh effects and devastating
consequences that the rule was severely criticized 2m and was
eventually abrogated in Buckley. As the Buckley court acknowl-
edged, "[tihe inherent injustice of a rule which denies a person,
free of fault, the right to recover for injuries sustained through
the negligence of another over whose conduct he has no control
merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that the other is
a fellow officer is manifest."287
Because of the unique facts presented in Cooper, as evi-
denced in the above diagram, it becomes clear that neither the
Firefighter's Rule nor the Fellow Servant Rule sufficiently an-
swers all legal questions entirely. Further, no case has ever
considered the precise legal theories here presented: the inter-
section of both rules and their limitations and exclusions. Nota-
bly, the New York Court of Appeals considered the same factual
but not legal circumstances of Cooper thirty years earlier in
Poniatowski v. City of New York. 288 In Poniatowski, when con-
285. See supra note 8.
286. See, e.g., Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 485,447 N.Y.S.2d 506
(2d Dep't 1981). See also supra note 32.
287. Buckley, 56 N.Y.2d at 304, 437 N.E.2d at 1089-90, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 333
(quoting Poniatowski, 14 N.Y.2d at 81, 198 N.E.2d at 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 851).
288. 14 N.Y.2d 76, 198 N.E.2d 237, 248 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1964). See supra notes
33-48 and accompanying text.
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sidering the claim of a passenger-recorder police officer injured
by the negligent driving of another officer, the Court of Appeals
stated: "There is no reason for not extending the relief thus af-
forded private persons to the police driver's fellow officers as
well."2 9 The only relevant difference between Poniatowski and
Cooper was that the plaintiff in Poniatowski sued under the
General Municipal Law, whereas Officer Cooper sued in com-
mon-law negligence. However, the Court of Appeals seemed to
downplay the significance of that distinction in its decision in
Poniatowski, focusing more clearly on the public policy aspect of
precluding recovery for the negligence of a fellow servant.290
The majority in Cooper barely acknowledged the preceden-
tial value of the Poniatowski decision or the strikingly similar
factual circumstances of the two cases, referring to Poniatowski
only by citation as an afterthought to its Buckley citations.291 It
would seem that if the majority intended to overrule, or even to
restrict the application or significance of its prior decision in
Poniatowski, it ought to have done more than simply cite the
decision at the end of a sentence. Absent any explanation from
the judges themselves, one cannot know why the Cooper court
did not explore Poniatowski's effect more fully. In any event,
after Buckley, the Fellow Servant Rule's barrier to recovery
seemed conclusively eliminated in New York and the pathway
to recovery seemed to be clear for injured police officers and
firefighters. No caveat was announced in Buckley that the in-
jured officer might have been denied recovery based on the Fel-
low Servant Rule. The majority in Cooper, however, chose to
reinstate the barrier, as Judge Titone stated, "for reasons which
are not apparent."292 Thus, the Fellow Servant Rule has effec-
tively been revived by the decision in Cooper,293 at least as the
rule applies to police officers and firefighters. With it, the ineq-
uity and devastating consequences of the Fellow Servant Rule
are similarly revived.
289. 14 N.Y.2d at 80, 198 N.E.2d at 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
290. See supra text accompanying note 48.
291. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 371, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
292. Id. at 594, 619 N.E.2d at 374, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 437 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
293. Id. at 598, 619 N.E.2d at 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
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B. Contradicting the Trend
The second reason the majority's decision in Cooper is im-
proper and somewhat alarming is that it is counter to a distinct
trend in New York case law and statutory law to grant recovery
to professional rescuers for line-of-duty injuries.
The preclusion of recovery by a police officer for injuries
caused by a fellow officer is illogical when one examines the
statutory remedies granted to police officers by the New York
State Legislature for recovery against third parties. 294 Since
the legislature, in an attempt to minimize the effects of the
Firefighter's Rule,295 has already determined that professional
rescuers should be permitted to recover from a potentially infi-
nite set of tortfeasors, it contradicts reason that the majority in
Cooper would not allow the same opportunity for recovery from
a finite set of highly trained professionals-the injured officer's
fellow employees.
While recovery was once precluded by both the common-
law Fellow Servant Rule and Firefighter's Rule, those days have
long since passed. With the complete abrogation of the Fellow
Servant Rule, and the "chipping away" at the Firefighter's Rule
by statute,296 by statutory interpretation 297 and by judicial rec-
ognition that the rule is simply too severe, it is clear that a
trend has emerged. New York courts and legislators have been
unwilling to leave professional rescuers totally devoid of a rem-
edy for injuries they may sustain in the line of duty. Thus, the
majority's decision represents a clear reversal of the trend in
New York State allowing recovery for on-the-job injuries.
Other states have also seen a limitation on the devastating
effects of doctrines such as the Firefighter's Rule to their police
officers and firefighters. 298 State courts and legislatures have
294. See supra part II.B.5.
295. Kenavan, 70 N.Y.2d at 566, 517 N.E.2d at 874, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
296. E.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw §§ 205-a, 205-e (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1995).
297. See, e.g., Kenavan v. City of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 558, 517 N.E.2d 872,
523 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1987).
298. See, e.g., Garcia v. City of South Tucson, 640 P.2d 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (applying test akin to the "separate and apart" test); Pottebaum v. Hinds,
347 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1984) (attempting to limit scope of Firefighter's Rule in
Iowa); Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984) (rejecting Firefighter's
Rule completely in Oregon).
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increased the statutory and common-law remedies available to
such professional rescuers. In addition to the changes in the
law regarding professional rescuers, the advent of workers'
compensation laws29 and judicial interpretations thereof indi-
cates a desire to protect workers from the relative dangers in
the workplace.30 This broad recognition-both within New
York State and without-of the increasing need to provide a
remedy for professional rescuers injured in the line of duty dem-
onstrates the contradictory nature of the Cooper decision from
the current legal trend.
C. Sound Public Policy?
Finally, from a public policy standpoint, the majority's posi-
tion is also inappropriate. The Firefighter's Rule and Fellow
Servant Rule traditionally precluded recovery by professional
rescuers 301 for injuries sustained in the line of duty based pri-
marily on the fact that such rescuers were held to have assumed
the risks inherent in their professions.30 2 Similarly, one of the
policy reasons offered in support of the Firefighter's Rule is that
police officers and firefighters "receive both training that en-
ables them to minimize the dangers their occupation requires
them to face, and compensation and special benefits to help as-
sure that the public will bear the costs of injuries suffered by its
protectors in the line of duty."303 This reasoning may support
the preclusion of recovery against third parties, but it does not
rationally support preclusion of recovery against a municipality
for the negligent acts of another officer. For while it may be
true that these professionals assume some of the risks inherent
in their careers, it cannot be said that they assume the risk of
negligence of their fellow employees. Police officers and
firefighters are not any more equipped to avoid the negligence of
299. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
300. In re Johannesen, 84 N.Y.2d 129, 136-39, 638 N.E.2d 981, 984-86, 615
N.Y.S.2d 336, 339-41 (1994) (broadly construing the term "accidental injury"
under Workers' Compensation Law to allow recovery where plaintiff's asthmatic
condition worsened due to prolonged exposure in workplace to secondhand smoke).
301. See discussion supra parts ll.A and II.B.
302. See supra notes 25-26, 81-84 and accompanying text.
303. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 590, 619 N.E.2d at 371-72, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 434-35
(citing Santangelo, 71 N.Y.2d at 397-98, 521 N.E.2d at 772, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 814).
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those with whom they work than they are to avoid the negligent
acts of third parties.30 4
The majority's holding in Cooper also creates a double stan-
dard for professional rescuers, based on whether the person
causing injury is a fellow worker or a third party. Since both
doctrines left firefighters and police officers without any remedy
for line-of-duty injuries, regardless of how negligent or careless
a third party might have been, the rules were thought by many
courts to be too harsh.305 Realizing the need for a remedy for
firefighters, the New York State Legislature explicitly created
one, in the form of General Municipal Law section 205-a.30 6 In
1989, this statutorily-created remedy was extended to police of-
ficers as well.30 7 Thus, professional rescuers are now left with a
double standard. If their injuries are caused by the negligence
of a property owner or other responsible party,308 recovery is al-
lowed under the statute. If, however, a police officer or
firefighter is injured as a result of the negligent act of another
municipal employee, recovery is barred under Cooper.
All four departments of the appellate division attempted to
reduce the impact of this inequity by creating an exception to
the Firefighter's Rule: the "separate and apart" exception. 30 9
This offered professional rescuers some chance of recovery for
line-of-duty injuries. If the negligence that caused their injuries
was sufficiently "separate and apart" from the act which occa-
sioned the need for the police officer or firefighter's services, re-
304. See supra text accompanying note 274. In fact, since police officers and
firefighters receive such special training, it may be fair to conclude that they are
less likely to expect the negligence of a fellow officer or firefighter than they are to
expect the same tortious conduct from a member of the public.
305. See, e.g., Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088,
452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982); Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 485, 447
N.Y.S.2d 506 (2d Dep't 1981). See supra notes 49-75 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these cases. See also supra note 32.
306. See supra part II.B.2.
307. See supra part II.B.5.
308. For a discussion of the importance of this distinction, see supra notes 84-
91 and accompanying text.
309. See supra part II.B.4. Even if the Court of Appeals had adopted the "sep-
arate and apart" theory of the appellate divisions, it is unlikely Officer Cooper
would have recovered under that theory because of the court's finding that her
injuries were "related to a particular risk that she had assumed as part of her
duties," the risk being "the possibility of injury while rushing to the scene of an
emergency." Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 590, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
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covery would be allowed. Thus, as in Starkey, where a police
officer responds to a citizen's complaint but, after investigating
the complaint, he or she investigates another suspicious or dan-
gerous situation, recovery would be permitted.3 10 Similarly, if a
police officer, in the course of investigating a crime, is injured
when he trips over trash negligently left in the hallway by the
owner of the building, recovery would also be permitted.311 Fur-
ther, if a police officer or firefighter is struck by a vehicle driven
by a third party while responding to an emergency, he or she
would also be allowed to recover.312 Yet if the tortfeasor is an-
other officer or firefighter, recovery is barred in New York State,
simply because "individuals who elect to join the uniformed
services do so with knowledge of the dangers attendant upon
those occupations and the distinct possibility that they might be
hurt in the course of their employment."313 This double stan-
dard is not only inequitable, but illogical, since there is no ra-
tional basis for the distinction in fact.
One notion the Court of Appeals in Cooper did not mention,
but might have been concerned about as a policy matter, is the
possibility of collusion between injured police officers or
firefighters and their negligent co-workers. It may be argued
that when a police officer is injured in circumstances similar to
the ones in Cooper, the police officer driving the vehicle at the
time of the accident has no stake in the ensuing litigation, and
therefore has nothing to lose by admitting his negligent acts.
This is not "collusion" in the traditional sense, but rather,
the suggestion that fellow officers have little to gain by denying
their negligence. Assuming that courts may be concerned with
this possibility, it hardly makes sense to preclude recovery
against a municipality when one of its employees is negligent
merely because of the "possibility" of collusion. This is espe-
310. See Starkey v. Trancamp Contracting Corp., 152 A.D.2d 358, 548
N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1989).
311. See Janeczko v. Duhl, 166 A.D.2d 257, 560 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1990)
(holding that police officer who tripped on carpet remnant left in hallway of apart-
ment building was not barred by Firefighter's Rule because the loose carpet was
"separate and unrelated" to the complaint the officer was investigating).
312. See Sharkey v. Mitchell's Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 165 A.D.2d 664, 560
N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1990).
313. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 590, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (quot-
ing Pascarella, 146 A.D.2d at 69, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 820)).
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cially true when the facts of a case clearly suggest otherwise, or
where, as in Cooper, the allegedly negligent officer is not even a
party to the action and therefore cannot "prejudice" the munici-
pality by admitting liability or negligence.
D. The Lesson of Cooper and the Requisite Nexus
Cooper sent a clear message to professional rescuers: it
barred all common-law claims of negligence "when the injury is
related to the dangers that are associated with police functions
. ... "314 Although the Court of Appeals attempted to loosely
define the actionable claims an officer would have when injured
by another officer-claims based on injuries similar to Officer
Pascarella or Officer Buckley31 5-those examples do not shed
much light on the matter. In Pascarella, for example, the injury
was not the result of a fellow officer's negligence. Rather, Pas-
carella was a strict application of the Firefighter's Rule as ap-
plied to police officers. Thus the majority's use of Pascarella as
an example of an actionable claim under Cooper seems
misplaced.
The other example cited by the majority was the fact pat-
tern presented in Buckley.316 However, in Buckley, although the
facts are not clear, it appears that the city could very easily
have asserted the Firefighter's Rule to successfully preclude re-
covery by the officer. Therefore, although the Cooper court re-
ferred to a "wide range of claims" 17 that would be actionable to
an officer injured by the hand of another, its not clear that such
a "wide range" actually exists, at least not from the examples
provided by the court.
Furthermore, in terms of actionable claims based not on the
negligence of another officer but on the negligence of a third
party, Cooper muddied the waters rather than clearing them
up. The court rejected the "separate and apart" exception ad-
vanced by the appellate divisions, but did not provide any fur-
ther definition. Instead, the court left the New York bar with
314. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
315. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
316. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 591-92, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435
(citing Buckley v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088,452 N.Y.S.2d
331 (1982)).
317. 81 N.Y.2d at 592, 619 N.E.2d at 373, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
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an amorphous concept: recovery for a line-of-duty injury sus-
tained by an officer is precluded when the injury is "related to
the dangers that are associated with police functions .... "318
The interpretation of that concept was left to the lower
courts.
3 1 9
V. Conclusion
Cooper was a major step backward in the trend permitting
recovery for professional rescuers injured in the line of duty.
The revival of the Fellow Servant Rule by the Court of Appeals
has erased the years of progress made in New York's statutory
and common law. This departure from a distinct trend in New
York to allow recovery for line-of-duty injuries must be reme-
died. Not only did the Cooper court ignore the earlier decisions
and rationale of the New York Court of Appeals, but it
presented an enormous obstacle to recovery for municipal em-
ployees that third parties do not face. This creates a unique
hardship for firefighters and police officers who, as a result of
Cooper, have no common-law recovery. In light of this harsh
result, the legislature should remedy Cooper's limitations, since
the Court of Appeals has evidenced its unwillingness to expose
318. Cooper, 81 N.Y.2d at 591, 619 N.E.2d at 372, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
319. On March 30, 1995, the New York Court of Appeals attempted to clarify
the requisite nexus between a police officer's line-of-duty injury and the special
hazards associated with the occupation of professional rescuers. In Zanghi v. Ni-
agara Frontier Transp. Comm'n, Nos. 49, 50, 51, 1995 WL 137280 (N.Y. March 30,
1995), the court decided three cases involving the strict application of the
Firefighter's Rule in New York. Id. at *1. The court stated:
We hold that the necessary connection is present where the performance of
the police officer's or firefighter's duties increased the risk of the injury hap-
pening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury. In other
words, where some act taken in furtherance of a specific police or firefight-
ing function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the partic-
ular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence.
Id. at *3.
Although none of the cases involved the negligence of a co-worker and, thus,
are not directly relevant to the fellow servant aspect of Cooper, the decision is sig-
nificant in that, in attempting to further define the "connection" required for the
Santangelo-Cooper bar to apply, it unified the Court of Appeals on this issue.
Judge Titone authored the opinion of the court. Id. at *1.
960 [Vol. 15:911
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/5
COOPER v. CITY OF NEW YORK
municipalities to liability for injuries to this special class of pro-
fessional rescuers.
Monique N. Thoresz*
* The author is grateful to the attorneys for both parties in Cooper, who al-
lowed access to relevant documents and provided insight which aided in the devel-
opment of this article.
The author would also like to thank Helene Rothman for her patience and
support, without which this article would not have been written.
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